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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah

DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of
the Estate of JOHN T. TOOMER,
Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

'Case No.
7472

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant anr]j App,ellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties will be designated on appeal herein the
same as they were designated in the trial court.
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Dwight L. King, as Administrator of the Estate of
John T. Toomer, Deceased, filed this action in the District
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
County, Utah, for and on behalf of Ida D. Toomer, widow,
and John J. Toomer, son, the surviving heirs of John T.
Toomer, deceased. The action was brought to recover damages for the death of John T. Toomer, who was instantly
killed in a crossing accident when a 1946 half-ton Chevrolet
pickup truck, which he was driving, came into collision with
defendant's Streamliner passenger train on what is known
as First Street crossing, which is the main street crossing
in Cokeville, Wyoming, on May 1, 1948. The truck being
driven by Toomer was owned by the Cokeville Land & Livestock Company, Toomer's employer, and that company assigned its interest and claim for damages with respect to
said truck to the plaintiff herein, and damages are also
sought by this action for the value of said truck.
The negligence charged against defendant by plaintiff as a basis of said action was that the defendant was
operating its Streamliner passenger train at a high rate
of speed in excess of the 30 miles per hour speed limit provided by ordinance in Cokeville, Wyoming; that the defend,ant obstructed the view of the deceased with respect to such
approaching Streamliner train by a freight train standing
on a passing track; and that defendant failed to have a
flagman or other employe at the crossing to warn approaching motorists (R. 20).
Defendant denied the charges of negligence and alleged that the accident was due to the negligence of the
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deceased, John T. Toomer, ooth upon the basis that the
negligence of said deceased was the sole proximate cause
of the accident, and that such negligence contributed to
cause the same so as to bar plaintiff from any right of
action herein.
At the conclusion of the evidence defendant moved for
a directed verdict (R. 378, 381). The court denied the
motion and submitted the case to a jury which returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John T. Toomer and his family lived 1n a company
house· owned by the Cokeville Land & Livestock Company,
his employer, which house was located immediately to the
west of the defendant railroad company's tracks and right
of way, some distance to the north of where said railroad
tracks pass over First Street, or the main street, in Cokeville, Wyoming (R. 205). The deceased and his family·
had resided in this same house for approximately 10 years
(R. 211). He was familiar with the crossing, having passed
over it numerous times during the 10 years, if not daily,
and he knew that the defendant railroad company's Streamliner passenger train passed through Cokeville sometime
d.uring the afternoon of each day (R. 212). First Street
runs east and west and the railroad tracks cross it approximately north and south. On May 1, 1948 Mr. Toomer
came home from work, got into the pickup truck, and drove
southward from his home on a roadway paralleling the
railroad tracks, south to First Street, going to the main
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· part of town east of the tracks in Cokeville to get some family
groceries (R. 207).
At and over the First Street crossing, the defendant
company maintained four separate tracks (Exhibit 1). The
two westerly tracks were designated as and known as passing tracks ( R. 107-R. 2) . The next or third track from the
west was the def~ndant company's single main line track.
A fourth track farther east was known as a siding or house
track. From the east rail of the west passing track to the
west rail of the second passing track, measured at right
angles, there was a distance of 8 feet 2112 inches. From the
east rail of the second passing track to the west rail of the
main line track, measured at right angles, there was a
distance of 10 feet 31/2 inches (R. 348, 352). Between the
main line track and the house track to the east there was
a distance of 48 feet. These distances were measured at
right angles, whereas First Street itself as it crosses the
tracks crosses at a slight variance from a right angle, as
will be shown by the map, Exhibit 1, which was introduced
into evidence upon stipulation of counsel at pretrial, and
which is drawn to a scale of one inch to 20 feet. At the
crossing, immediately to the west of the westerly track and
to the east of the easterly of the four tracks on the south
side of First Street, is a standard railroad crossbuck sign
(Exhibits 1 and G) . Immediately to the east of the main
line track and on the south side of First Street is located an
automatic wigwag crossing signal, which crossing signal
consists of a disk about 24 inches in diameter, with a red
light about six inches in diameter in the center thereof (R.
I

~

I
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339). When this signal is in operation the disk wigwags or
swings back-and-forth, the red light in the center is lighted,
and a bell on the mechanism rings.
As Mr. Toomer approached the crossing on May 1,
there was one of defendant's freight trains, headed north,
standing on the middle of the three west tracks. on the
passing track just west of the main line, the front of the
engine, as stated by various of plaintiff's witnesses, being
30 (R. 108), 40 (R. 115) or 50 feet (R. 130) south of the
crossing, and according to Mr. Harmon, son-in-law of deceased and one of plaintiff's witnesses, 32 feet south of the
end of the planking as measured by him according to his
best recollection of where the engine stood, although
measured sometime after the accident and after the train
had moved (R. 185). Defendant's witnesses testified that
the front of the engine was considerably farther to the·
south down in front of the depot and freight warehouse, and
that the freight started to move as the passenger train approached and after the accident came to a stop where the
front of the engine then was some 75 to 100 feet south of·
the crossing (R. 217, 221).
There is no claim by plaintiff that the defendant did
not sound the whistle or bell on the Streamliner passeng~r
train, and various witnesses, both those produced by plaintiff and defendant, testified that numerous whistles were
sounded on the Streamliner (R. 136, 146-147, 165, 249250, 222, 341). Defendant's witnesses testified the bell
on the Streamliner was ringing (R. 27 4-275, 297-298),
and no witness testified to the contrary. Some of plahi-
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tiff's witnesses and most of defendant's witnesses testified that the wigwag at the crossing was in operation,
swinging back-and-forth, with the light on and the wigwag bell ringing (R. 136-137, 220-221, 252, 270-271, 310,
Exhibit 2). Those who did not so testify made no observation from which they could state one way or the other, and
it was not disputed by plaintiff that the, wigwag was in
actual and proper operation during all of the time involved
immediately preceding the a.ccident and for some little time
thereafter. The wigwag signal was activated and operated
only by approaching trains on the main line track, the
contact point which would start the signal operating being
1650 feet south of the crossing (R. 338). The wigwag
signal was never activated or caused to operate by trains on
either of the passing tracks or on the house track to the
east, and never had been connected up so that it would
operate or be operated by trains on any track other than the
main line track ( R. 338-339) .
Trains passed in Cokeville at various times, and the
two tracks west of the main line track were designated as
passing tracks and were known by residents in Cokeville
as passing tracks (R. 133-134, 107). At the time of the
accident there was no flagman at the crossing but the
wigwag was in operation as stated above.
The day was stormy, and while one or two of plaintiff's witnesses thought it was snowing at the time, others
of plaintiff's witnesses and all of defendant's witnesses
stated that it had been snowing but at the time of the accident the snow had ceased and sometime later it started
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to snow again (R. 109, 114, 121, 127, 137, 155, 162, 163, 239,
252, 280, 298) . Being a spring storm the snow came in
large flakes but was not enough to lie on the ground (R.
112). According to Toomer's son-in-law Harmon, in spite
of the storm, visibility was good at least for 200 yards (R.
188).
Plaintiff's witnesses were able to observe the train
and the approaching truck of the deceased for considerable
distance from the track, and the fireman and engineer on
the Streamliner train were able to observe the order board
approximately a mile from the depot (R. 280-281, 298).
Plaintiff's witness S. C. Curtis was 5 or 6 blocks away,
coming from the east end of town and traveling in a westerly direction, and he watc~ed both the Streamliner and
the truck in 'vhich deceased was riding for some little time
as they approached the crossing (R. 146-147). Plaintiff's
witness Eldon Dayton was a block or more east of the crossing, traveling west, and he saw the Streamliner approaching and heard the whistle (R. 136).
As the deceased, John T. Toomer, approached the
crossing, traveling southward from his home, he was traveling 25 or 30 miles an hour (R. 221, 277-278, 301-302, 319).
The windows on his truck were up and he did not slacken
speed or stop at any time (R. 320, 278, 301, 319, 329, 330).
He turned onto First Street and traveled eastward over the
crossing at approximately 30 miles an hour up until the
moment when the center of his truck and the left front. of
the diesel engine on the Streamliner came into collision at
the crossing. The Streamliner was travelng in a northerly
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direction. Apparently Toomer was killed instantly, being
thrown from his truck at the impact, and the truck was
fastened onto the left side of the front portion of the diesel
engine and carried a distance of a pp~oximately 1600 feet
to the north, where the Streamliner came to rest. The
emergency brakes were not applied on the Streamliner
engine, the railroad employes testifying that -at the speed
the deceased was moving and the distance between the
train and the truck when they first saw the truck, any
emergency application of the brakes. would be unavailing as
far as the accident was concerned and could have done nothing except to upset and possibly injure passengers on the
Streamliner ( R. 278-279) .
One or two of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the
train was going in the neighbor hood of 50 miles an hour
a~d others could not give a fair estimate of the speed of the
train (R. 128, 145) ; while defendant's witnesses testified
that the train was going about 30 miles an hour at the time
of the impact, but faster than that prior to the impact (R.
223, 276-277, 290-291, 300). The engineer testified that the
speedometer on the train showed 33 miles an hour as he
passed the depot building, and the train was slowing down
at the time, so that in his opinion it was going approximately 30 miles an hour at the moment of impact (R. 291).
There were none of plaintiff's witnesses able to give
any evidence as to the speed at which the deceased was
traveling in his truck and therefore the testimony of defendant's witnesses that he was traveling 25 to 30 miles an hour
stands undisputed in the record.
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The only evidence as to the movements of the deceased,
except from the witness Curtis, who saw him approaching
and concluded there was going to be a collision with the
train (R. 146), came from defendant's witnesses who stated
that the deceased, John T. Toomer, never at any time slowed
down or stopped prior to passing over the tracks at the
crossing, in spite of the fact that the wigwag was in operation (R. 221, 250-252, 278, 301). The witness Curtis observed him for some little time and concluded there was
going to be a collision between the train and the truck,
but during the time of his observation Curtis, who was
plaintiff's witness, stated that the truck never stopped or
slowed down (R. 147).
No statutes or other laws of the State of Wyoming or
of the Town of Cokeville were pleaded or put in evidence
other than the ordinance limiting speed of trains to 30 miles
per hour, and therefore there is nothing in the record to
show that the law of Wyoming is in any respect different
from the laws of Utah as applied to circumstances surrounding this accident other than the one ordinance setting the
speed limit of trains at 30 miles per hour ..
There was no charge in the pleadings and no issue
raised thereby with respect to the crossing being extra
hazardous in any respect, and there was no evidence given
at the trial that would show or tend to show that the crossing was such as to require any additional or extra precautions to be taken by the defendant railroad company.
Some few facts in addition to those hereinabove stated
will be referred to in argument, and particularly more de-
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tail concerning facts as hereinabove stated will be pointed
out during the course of the argument.

STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMMITTED BY
THE TRIAL COURT AND POINTS UPON
WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY
FOR REVERSAL.
1. The trial court erred in denying and overruling
defendant's motion for a directed verdict as made at the
conclusion of all the evidence.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 1.

The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 10,
and particularly subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) thereof.
3.

4. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (c)
of paragraph (1) of Instruction No. 10.
5. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (b)
of paragraph (2) of Instruction No. 23.
6. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (c)
of paragraph (2) of Instruction No. 23.
7.

The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 12.

8.

The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 13.

9. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (f)
of Instruction No. 13.
10. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (g)
of Instruction No. 13.
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11. The trial court erred in giving· subparagraph (h)
of Instruction No. 13.
12. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (i)
of Instruction No. 13.
13. The trial court erred in giving the concluding
paragraph of Instruction No. 13.
14. The trial court erred in giving Instruction No.
15, and particularly that portion of No. 15 stating: "There
is a presumption that at and prior to the time of the collision that the said Toomer was exercising ordinary care
for his own protection."
15. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 4.
16. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 5.
17. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 15.
18. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 16.
19. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 21.
20. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 23.
21. The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 25.
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22. The trial court erred in refusing to grant defendant's motion for new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL
OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1. (Statement of Errors 1 and 2).
The accident upon which this suit was brought happened in the State of Wyoming, and in spite of that fact
and the fact that suit was brought thereon within the State
of Utah, the plaintiff did not plead any statutes of the State
of Wyoming or ordinances of the City of Cokeville to show
that the Wyoming law was different in any respect from
the Utah law, except with respect to the one instance where
the ordinance of Cokeville was pleaded and admitted which
set a speed limit of 30 miles an hour for trains moving
through Cokeville. It is a general rule followed by most
jurisdictions and_ established and reaffirmed by this court
in numerous cases that where the laws of a foreign state
are not pleaded or offered in evidence, our courts, including
the Supreme Court, must conclude that the laws of such
state are the same as those of the forum.
In the case of Dickson v. Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241
P. 840, a surety company which had given bond in the
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State of New York was involved in a habeas corpus proceeding brought in the State of Utah after the criminal, who
had violated his bond, was found within the State of Utah.
In that case this court held :
"Whether the state of New York has a statute
on the subject is not shown. No such or any statute
of New York is either pleaded or proved. It, of
course, is well settled that state courts cannot take
judicial notice of laws or statutes of a sister state.
It also is well settled in this jurisdiction (Cases
.. cited) that, in the absence of proof, it will be presumed that the law of another state is the same as
the law of the forum and the cou'rt will administer
and apply the law of the jurisdiction until the law
of the situs is shown. Thus, in the absence of proof,
it will be presumed that the law of New York on the
subject is the same as the law of Utah."
In the case of Whitmore Oxygen Co. v. Utah State Tax
Commission, ... Utah ... , 196 P. 2d 976, it was held that
the statutes of a sister state would be presumed to be the
same as Utah statutes where the statutes of the sister state
were not pleaded or proved.

See also:

Buhler v. Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P. 2d
933.

United .A.ir Lines Transport Co~. v. Industrial
Commission, 107 Utah 52, 151 P. 2d 591.
Gillespie v. Blood, 81 Utah 3.06, 17 P. 2d 822.
Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 P. 298.
McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 81,
222 P. 592.

Grow v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 44 Utah 160, 138 P. 398.
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 P·. 423.
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At the time of the accident in question the laws. of
Utah provided as follows.:
Utah Code Annotated 1943, Section 57-7-159.
"Whenever any person driving a vehicle ap.
proaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver of
such vehicle shall stop within 50 feet but not less
than 10 feet from the nearest track of such railroad
and shall not proceed until he can do so safely when:
"(a) A clearly visible electric or mechanical
signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a train.
"(b) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a
human flagman gives or continues to give a signal
of' the approach or passage of a train.
"(c) A railroad train approaching within ap.
proximately 1,500 feet of the highway crossing emits
a signal audible from such distance· and such train
by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is
an immediate hazard.
''(d) An approaching train is plainly visible
and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing."
Section 57-7-224, which is a part of the same enactment, reads :
"It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate
any of the provisions of this. act, unless such violation is by this act or other law of this state declared
to be a felony."
Thus the law which wo~ld be applicable to the accident
involved in this case required that any or every person
when approaching a railroad crossing in a vehicle "shall
stop within 50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he
can do so safely when: (a) A clearly visible electric or me-
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chanica} signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a train. * * *"
In his complaint the plaintiff said nothing about the·
existence or operation of a mechanical warning signal at
the crossing but did charge the defendant with negligence
for failure to station a flagman at the crossing to warn
travelers. At the trial, however, the evidence, without dispute, showed that there was a mechanical wigwag signal
at the crossing near the main line track, with a wigwag arm
containing a disk 24 inches in diameter with a 6 inch red
light in the center thereof, and a bell attached to said
mechanism, and that at all times surrounding the occurrence of the accident the wigwag was in operation, swinging back-and-forth, the light in the center of the wigwag
was on red, and the bell mechanism in connection with the
wigwag signal was ringing. The only witnesses who testified with respect to such signal confirmed the fact of its
operation, and nowhere in the pleadings, evidence, or argument did the plaintiff attempt to dispute the fact that such
signal was in proper operation at the time.
I

The evidence conclusively and affirmatively shows
that the deceased, John T. Toomer, as he approached this
crossing approached it at a speed between 25 and 30 miles
an hour; that he never at any time slowed down or came
to a stop, but without slackening his speed drove over the
crossing in the face of the operating mechanical signal and
into the collision with defendant's Streamliner passenger
train.
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At this point we should like to refer to the testimony.
Plaintiff's witness S. C. Curtis, who was 5 or 6 blocks east
of the crossing on First Street (R. 147), testified (R. 145147):

"A. Well, I was considerable distance away
and I saw this car coming, but the Streamliner- ·.·.·.
they came immediately onto the crossing together,

* * *"
With respect to the truck he said:
"A.

Well, I just saw it coming.
"Q. Which way was it coming?
"A. It was coming east.
"Q. Did you see it when it turned from a
southerly direction, to turn east?
"A. No, I didn't see it when it turned.
"Q. How long did you watch him?
"A. Well, I was pretty much concerned about
the way they were coming, so close together.
"Q. ·C'ould you see the Streamliner before it
arrived at the street here?

*

*

*

*

•

*

*

*

*

*

"A. I watched it off and on all the way up,
coming up the track.
Now getting back to this truck, when
you first saw him he was coming east on First
Street?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And about how long did you observe him,
would you say?
"A. Well, I was driving along and I was watching the road, and other things·, and I just happened
to see him momentarily when he first came into my
vision.
''Q.
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"Q.

"A.

Did you ever see him stop?
No, I never saw him stop."

The witness Charles Mackey testified that he say
Toomer coming south on the roadway to the west of and
paralleling th~ tracks (R. 319, 320, 329-330) :
Can you give us - When Mr. Toomer
passed you can you give us an opinion as to how
fast he was· going?
"A. I would say 25, 30 miles an hour.
"Q.

*

*

*

*

*

Did you ever at any time, from the time
he passed up by the toolhouses, until he got to the
crossing, see him slow down?
"A. N o, sir.
.
"Q. Did you observe anything with respect to
what he did, one way or the other?
"A. The only thing I know, he kept going, and
he hadn't stopped until he hit the train, that is all.
"Q.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

When you saw Mr. Toomer is. that where
you say he was going 25 or 30 miles an hour?
"A. y es, sir.
.
"Q. You didn't see him any more after that,
did you?
"A. I could see him until he hit the crossing.
"Q.

Did you watch Mr. Toomer at all?
"A. I turned just as he hit the crossing."

"Q.

The witness

~aylor,

engineer on the freight, testified

(R.221):
"Q.

Did you observe the truck before he was

"A.

y es.

hit?

*

*

*

*

*
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"A. I estimate his speed at about 30 miles,
approximately 30 miles as he crossed over the crossing.
"Q. · Did you ever, at any time, see him stop?
"A. No.
"Q. Did you see him slow down?
"A. No."
The same witness testified with respect to the point
whe~:"e he first saw Toomer's truck (R. 228-229):
"A. Well, I could, I believe I could see that
automobile when it hit the-when it came on the
rail, the west side of that passing track.

*

*

*

*

*

"A.. The first I saw was at about the time it
came over the west rail of the track I was standing
on."
The witness Earl Wilcox testified that he was on the
west side of the standing freight engine, and he saw first
the Cozzens car or sedan and then. Toomer's truck go by
(R. 249). Wilcox testified (R. 250) :
"Q.

Would you say he was going slow or fast,

or what?
"A. He was going fast, yes."
In response to a question as to whether the truck
stopped the witness stated that Toomer couldn't have stopped, and upon counsel's motion that answer was stricken,
but later on (R. 251), the court overruled the objection to
the following question and it was answered as follows :
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And should he have stopped at any time
west of those tracks, would you have seen him?
"A. That is right."
"Q.

The witness Reed, engineer of the Streamliner, testified ( R. 277-278) :
"A. The next I seen was a truck come from the
west and was just coming on to the passing track
as I was coming up the road crossing.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"A. * * * I think he was just coming up
to what we term as the eastbound passing track.
"Q. That is the furthest west of the three?
"A. It is the outside passing track.
"A. Well, I would say he was going just about
the same speed I was, 30 miles an hour, * * *
During the time after you first saw him
until he got right on the main line ahead of you did
he ever, at any time, slow down with his truck?
"A. N o, sir.
.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.

Did he slow down at all?
No, sir."

Vernon A. Wilcox, fireman on the Streamliner, testified
(R. 301-302) :
"Q.

Where was the truck when you first saw

it?
"A.

It was about 50 or 60 feet from us.
"Q. And where with reference to those tracks
would you say it would be?
"A. I would say it was about 10 feet the other
side of the outside of the west passing.
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To the west of the west passing track?
And can you give us an opinion as to about how fast
the truck was going?
"A. He was going about the same speed we
were. That was about the same speed, distance from
the main line as we were from the crossing there.
"Q. About the same distance?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And you met right at the crossing?
"A.. That is right.
"Q. As he came across those tracks. and up to
the crossing, did he slow down at all?
"A. He didn't slow down."
"Q.

The witness Sparks. walked across the crossing, and
after crossing the main line turned around and watched
the Streamliner, but never did see Toomer until just at the
moment of impact (R. 310).
It is true that none of the witnesses could testify that
they were watching Mr. Toomer all of the time from the time
he left his home until the accident, but various ones saw
him at various times during his journey toward the crossing,
and not one of them-either of plaintiff's or defendant's
witnesses-at any time saw him slow down or stop. If he
had slowed down or stopped the witness Mackey would
have known it. If he had slowed down or stopped at any
time he could not possibly have been going the 25 or 30 miles
per hour, which was his undisputed speed, at a point to the
west of the west passing track when the fireman and engineer of the Streamliner first saw him, as was stated by the
fireman on the standing freight train, Earl E. Wilcox.
Under the circumstances, he co:uld not pos.sibly have
stopped in his progress toward the track or some one of the
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many witnesses would have seen him ,standing waiting
there, rather than, as the fireman and the engineer of the
Streamliner testified, that he was proceeding at 30 miles
an hour at some point at least 10 feet west of the west passing track and continued at that same rate of speed without
slowing or stopping until the collision, and this in spite
of all of the signals being given at the time.
The action of the deceased, John T. Toomer, in so attempting to pass over the crossing in the face of such warning was in direct violation of the laws above quoted and
as such constituted negligence on his part as a matter of
law. The trial court should have so held and should have
granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict upon
the basis that the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence--if not guilty of negligence constituting th~ sole
proximate cause of the accident.
There have been a number of cases before our Utah
courts involving a situation where a mechanical warning
signal has been located at a crossing, but at the time of the
accident in question it has been found that the signal was
not operating as it should, and this court on several occasions has held that even under such circumstances where
a mechanical signal has been located at the crossing but
fails to operate and give warning as it should, nevertheless
a traveler on the highway is not entitled to place entire reliance upon such signal or upon the failure of the signal to
activate, but must still exercise reasonable care in looking
and listening for trains which may be approaching. If that
is true, what should be the situation when a mechanical
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signal is located at a crossing and admittedly is operating
properly, but a traveler attempts to pass over the crossing
in face of such warning and is injured and killed?
We have been unable to find where such a question
has heretofore been presented to this court, and therefore
the question as it is involved in this case is, in our opinion,
one of first impression here. However, the statute as above
referred to is a uniform statute, and either in identical terms
or in very similar terms has. been in force in other j urisdictions and cases involving the failure of such a driver to pay
proper heed to such a mechanical warning have reached
the highest courts of many of our sister states. Counsel for
appellant herein have made a search of cases, and while
we do not necessarily contend that the cases found constitute all of the cases upon such subject, we have found
no case involving such facts wherein a court has held that
such a driver is not guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. The cases seem to be unanimous in holding
that such conduct does amount to negligence as a matter
of law. Particularly is that true where the statute, as is
the case with our statute, provides a misdemeanor or other
criminal penalty where there is a violation of such statutory
provision.
In the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Folger, 170 F.
2d 238, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit had before it similar question involving an Ohio
statute which provided:
"No person shall drive a vehicle across a railroad grade crossing when :
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" (a) A clearly visible electric or mechanical
signal device gives warning of the immediate approach of a train * * *."
In that case there were four sets of railroad tracks
extending over the crossing and flasher light. signals were
located at the crossing. As Folger approached the crossing
a freight train was standing on a side track with the front
end of the engine some 250 feet or 300 feet east of the highway. An eyewitness testified that Folger did slow down
but did not stop his automobile and continued across the
crossing and was struck and killed by a passenger train.
The question of the extent of view that Folger may have
had was not discussed. It appeared that the accident happened at approximately midnight. However the Federal
Court disposed of the case rather summarily, stating as
follows:
"Here the uncontradicted evidence shows that
flasher lights were in operation during the entire
period of the accident. The locomotive was some
490 feet west of the crossing, going 70 miles. an
hour at the time the automobile was some 70 feet
from the track. The all-important fact is that the
passenger train was within the circuit of the flasher
light, which is conceded to be 3387 feet west of the
crossing, as the decedent drove up to the tracks.

* * *
"We deem it unnecessary to discus'S' the question
of physical obstructions on the right of way and the
layout of the tracks, because in our view· one proposition is determina.tive, namely, that the evidence,
when considered in the light most favorable to the
appellee, establishes as a matter of law that the decedent was guilty of contributory neg·ligence which
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proximately contriquted to cause his death. It is
uncontradicted on this record that tke de·c·edent drooe
across the crossing in violation of statute, and tk~
was guilty ot·negligence per s·e." (Italics ours.)
It appeared in that case, different from what the evidence shows in the case at bar, that the freight train on the
side track may also have activated the flasher signal, but
with respect to that the Federal Appellate Court stated:

"* * * The fact that the flasher light was
also giving warning of the presence of the standing
freight train does not affect the determinative importance of the circumstance that the decedent had
warning of the approach of ·the pa~senger train.
·"Under these conceded facts, the case tfalls
squarely within the ambit of Section 6307-60, General Code of Ohio. Driving across the grade crossing
under these circumstances was negligence per se,
· under long-established Ohio law. ('Cases cited.)"
In that case the trial court had submitted the matter
to a jury and a verdict had been rendered for the plaintiff,
but the appellate court concluded:
"The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the
appellant.''

Brown v. Pennsy.lvania R. Co., (Ohio) 61 N. E. 2d 163,
is a case in which plaintiff as she approached a railroad
crossing, and some distance from the tracks, saw flasher
lights flashing at the crossing. She stopped a short distance from the crossing, waited some little time, and as no
train approached, she put her car in low gear, started over
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the tracks, and got up to a speed of about 10 miles an hour.
As she got onto the tracks the motor in her car stalled and
she then saw a train approaching. The trial court submitted the matter to a jury, which returned a verdict for the
plaintiff. The court of appeals stated that the trial court
should have directed a verdict, and in reversing the trial
court stated :
~'It

is not necessary to discuss the issue of the
defendant's negligence raised by the pleadings and
evidence, since the evidence on that issue was conflicting and the jury was justified in finding that
certain acts of negligence were committed by the
defendant. The chief legal question, as we see it, is
whether the undisputed evidence discloses that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.

*

*

*

*

*

"The record discloses that when she was approaching the railroad crossing, Elizabeth Brown
saw the automatic signals flashing. She stopped at
the track because they were flashing. She did not
see a train but other automobiles were crossing the
tracks, so she drove on the crossing and her car
stalled there. She says that she did not see the lights
flashing just as she drove upon the tracks, but yet
there is undisputed evidence that they were in good
condition; that they had been flashing a short time
before the accident, and they were also flashing
after the accident, and it can reasonably be p-resumed that they were flashing when she drove upon
the crossing.. She did not see the lights flashing as
she started to cross the tracks, but she does not say
that she looked at the lights at this time. We feel
that it can be reasonably presumed that since she
was intent upon looking for a train, that she did not
look just before she started over the tracks to see

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2t:

if they were flashing at that time. The rule, we
think, is well established in Ohio, that one who
drives his automobile on a railroad crossing disregarding the watchman with a stop sign, or a bell,
or flashing signals, is guilty of contributory negli. .
gence as a matter of law, when struck by an oncoming train."

In the case of Byerly v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. et al.,
(Wash.) 120 P. 2d 453, the Washington statute provided
that a person operating a vehicle as involved in the case
should stop within 50 feet but not less than 20 feet, and
"not p,roceed until he can do so safely. The operator of any
vehicle shall stop his vehicle and remain standing and not
, traverse any railroad grade crossing * * * when a
* * * mechanical or electric signal gives or continues
to give a signal of the approach or passage of any train
* * *." Byerley was driving a truck and approached and
attempted to pass over a crossing which was protected by a
mechanical wigwag signal. It was not contended that the
wigwag signal was not working, or that the signal bell attached to it was not ringing, but it was contended that the
signal was so located that it was not clearly visible and that
the signal bell was not loud enough to be audible to one
approaching in a truck. The trial court submitted the matter to a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the
Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial court with
instructions to enter a judgment dismissing the action.
The Washington Supreme Court stated:
f

"We are clearly of the opinion that the testimony is conclusive that at the time of the accident,
the wigwag signal was clearly visible to Mr. Byer-
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ley as he approached the crossing; that it was working, and that the bell in connection therewith was
ringing loudly enough to be heard a distance of 293
feet. In our opinion, if Mr. Byerley did no~t se~ tke
signal, it was because he did not look, and it canno·t·
be contended that he looked and did not see that
which he must have seen had he looked. We are also
sa.tisfied that had he listened, he must have heard
the signal bell." (Italics ours.)
There was some discussion in that case of what was
termed a reasonable margin of safety rule. With respect
to that, the Washington Supreme Court stated:

"* * *

We seriously doubt that the reasonable margin of safety rule could or should be applied in favor of one approaching a railroad crossing such as the one in question, hav.,ing a standard
automatic signal device, which is clearly visible and
operating at the time. We have never so held, nor
have we been cited to any case so holding."
In the case there was a discussion with respect to equal
and reciprocal rights of travelers on a highway with railroad trains, and with respect to that the Washington
Supreme Court stated:

"* * *

we cannot believe that the rights of
such user of the highway and the train are equal~
when, as in this case, there was a warning signal
in operation, complying with the state law, and
again may we state we have been cited to no case
which so holds. This signal is not a warning that
one on the highway must just look and listen, after
which he may, under certain circumstances, proceed,
but the statute says he shall stop his vehicle and
remain standing and not traverse any railroad grade
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crossing when a huma~ flagman or mechanical or
electrical· signal gives or continues. to give a signal
of the approach or passage of any train. We cannot
help but conclude that under the circumstances last
above stated, and such as appeared at this. crossing
at the time of the accident, the train had the absolute right of way over highway traffic, from the time
such signal began to operate until the train had
passed over the crossing."
A number of courts have held a person to be contributorily negligent where in an ordinary passenger car he
attempts to pass over a crossing in the face of a warning
signal from a flagman or mechanical signal, and there are
likewise cases involving vehicles engaged as public carriers
of passengers, or inflammable liquid or dangerous explosives, or vehicles of an excess size or weight, with respect to
which similar holdings have been given by the various
courts.
In the ·case of Garbacz v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.,
(Mich.) 34 N. W. 2d 531, a heavily ladened vehicle was
involved. In that case the trial court directed a verdict for
defendant, and the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the
trial court. We quote from the opinion :
"Plaintiff claims. that the blinker warning signals at the crossing were not working, that no bells
or whistle were sounded, for if they had been, he
would have heard them. He admitted, however, that
he did not bring his tractor and trailers. to a stop,
as required by law. He had been traveling at a rate
of 35 miles per hour, but reduced his speed to 20 to
25 miles. per hour as. he· neared the tracks. When
about 25 feet from the tracks, he first saw the train
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approaching about 50 feet to his. right. He tried to
avoid the collision by attempting to stop and swerving to the left."
The law applicable to the case provided that such a
vehicle should not be driven across the railroad tracks at
grade without first bringing the vehicle to a full stop within 50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the tracks, and
that the driver "shall not proceed until he shall have determined that it is safe to cross." The Michigan Supreme
Court held: "Violation of the law is negligence per se." The
court also stated:
"Plaintiff contends, however, that the·re· is no
showing that the failure to stop before crossing the
tracks contributed to the accident. 1t is not necessary to show ~vhat was so perfectly obvious. It w-ould
follow from what the proofs disclosed, that at the rate
the train was approaching, had plaintiff stopped,, he
would have seen the train straight ahead of him or
it would have crossed the road before he started
again. Where the record is suck that men with rear
sonable minds w-ould not differ, as here, there is' no
question of faet for the jury. Swift v. Kenbeek, 289
Mich. 391, 286 N. W. 658." (Italics ours.)

In the case of Lang v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (Wis.)
< 40 N. W. 2d 548, plaintiff sued for injuries to himself and
. damages to his truck. In that case there was also a statute
>which required a person driving a truck to stop not less
·: than 20 or more than 40 feet from the track, and the evi;.:. dence showed that the plaintiff did not stop as required by
~~.· law. The trial court submitted the matter to a jury, which
~; returned a verdict for plaintiff. The Wisconsin Supreme

'J

~:

~,.
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Court held Lang to be guilty of negligence as, a matter of
law and reversed the trial court's judgment. In that case
it appeared that there were box cars on a side track near
the street which obstructed the view of an approaching
motorist, and the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
"A railroad company which, by leaving cars
near or upon a public crossing, has obstructed the
view and created an extra danger to travelers, is
bound to use extra precaution in the operation of
its trains by approaching the crossing at a less
amount of speed or by increased warnings, or otherwise, and the fact that the crossing is within the
yard of the railroad company makes no difference;
and such railroad company is negligent if it leaves
a car near or upon a public crossing and thereby
obstructs the view and creates an extra danger to
travelers without taking such extra precautions in
the operation of its trains.''
With respect to this instruction the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin stated :

"No authority is cited to support the instruction as applied to the facts in this case, and we find
none.
"It is considered that this is an incorrect statement of the-law. In the first place it entirely ignores
the effect of the statutory requirement that a person driving a' truck across the main line tracks of · · · · · ·
a railway at a grade shall stop his truck at least
20 and not more than 40 feet away. * * *
''In placing the box car where they did, which
was at a point, according to the testimony of the
plaintiff, six to eight feet east of the east sidewalk
on Pine street, defendant's employees had a right
to assume that persons driving trucks across the
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intersection would obey the statutory command and
come to a full stop not less than 20 nor n1ore· than
40 feet from the main line. * * *
··It is appa·rent that if the plaintiff hcuJJ complied ~vith the 'requiremen.ts of the statute no accident 'lvould have occurred." (Italics ours.)
The Supreme Court stated further:

"* * * The trainmen were not required to
anticipa.te that a tnwk driver crossing the main line
track wo1Jld violate the statutory· rule and not stop.
"* * * To excuse the pla.intiff from performing his statutory duty under the circumstances
of th-is case would amount to noth~ng less than an
amMtdment of the statute. The statute makes no· exceptions. A truck driver is required under the statute to come to a full stop, not to stop at his discretion. * * *" (Italics ours.)
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.)
47 N. E. 2d 615, an Indiana statute provided that any driver
of a motor vehicle transporting explosives or highly inflammable materials should not drive upon tracks of a railroad
company "unless such person shall first bring such vehicle
to a full stop, and, shall ascertain definitely that no train,
car or engine is approaching such crossing and is in such
close proximity thereto as to create a hazard or danger of
a collision." Powell was driving a gasoline truck which
came into collision with one of defendant's trains. There
was a wigwag and bell at the crossing, and there was a
provision of the statute above referred to that the act should
not apply to railroad crossings equipped with mechanical
crossing signals. The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded
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that: "It must have been the legislative conclusion that,
of course, all travelers would take notice of the warning
afforded by mechanical signals," and in spite of the exception in the statute, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's verdict and judgment for plaintiff and
held the deceased to have been guilty of negligence as a
matter of law for failing to observe and heed the mechanical signal, and for failing to stop in response to its warning.
The jury found that the locomotive whistle and bell were
properly sounded and that the automatic crossing bell was
ringing, but that the decedent heard none of these signals.
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court stated that there
was no dispute concerning the fact that the crossing signal
was in actual operation. With respect thereto the Indiana
Supreme Court stated:

"* * * There is no allegation or proof of
any abnormal situation that would have prevented
the decedent from hearing the signal. It was heard
by many persons farther away from the crossing
than the decedent. It must be concluded that he
could have heard it if he had listened, and that he
either heard the signal and proceeded upon the· track
notwithstanding, or that he failed to give his attention and to listen for the signal. In either event he
was negligent, and the negligence was a definite contributing cause of the collision.''
Because of conflict in the evidence with respect to
signals from the train, the Supreme Court said that although the preponderance of the evidence indicated that
these signals were given, still because of some conflicting
testimony, it would have to be assumed on the appeal that
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the railroad was negligent with respect to signals from the
train. In spite of this fact and in spite of the fact that
the court said such negligence should be considered as a contributing cause, the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the
trial court on the basis that the negligence of Powell also
contributed to the accident. It appeared in evidence that
there was some obstruction to vision, and with respect to
this the jury found that the deceased could see down the
main track only to the extent of 150 feet when his motor
vehicle was at a point 14 feet south of the south end of the
ties on the main track of the crossing, and for a distance
of 400 feet when his vehicle was 6 feet 2 inches south of the
'
south end of the ties; that the obstructed vision prevented
him from seeing the train, and because of such obstructed
vision he slowed his speed. There was no evidence, however, as to whether he stopped his truck. The jury based
its verdict entirely upon the fact of the obstructed vision,
plus the speed at which the train was operating. In reversing the trial court the Indiana Supreme Court stated
that there was no evidence of unusual noises calculated to
interfere with the hearing of usual signals and warnings.
With respect to interference with the vision and signals
the Supreme Court stated:
"The .appellee says that there was fog and. rain
which interfered with vision and with hearing signals, but, if so, the fact must have been apparent.
It did not affect the signals; it merely affected the
ability of the traveler to see and hear. The law re-

quires that he use care in looking· and listening, ant!J
this ca.re must be commensurate with the conditions
which confront him. There is no allegation in the
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complaint that the signals were inadequate because
of weather conditions, nor do we· find any evidence
of fog. There was some evidence that it was· raining. But the decedent was acquainted with the crossing and with the automatic signal upon which he relied. If rain interfered with the normal opportunity
to observe these signals of danger, it was his duty
to take cognizance of the fact and to use his senses
in a 1'Ytanner reasonably calculated to~ inform him
of approaching dang·er. He was not free to drive
blindly into a place of known danger. * * *"
(Italics ours.)
As a conclusion from the findings of the Jury, the
Supreme Court stated with respect to deceased:

"* * * that he either heard the bell and
went upon the crossing notwithstanding, or that he
failed to give his attention to and listen for the automatic signal. In either event he was guilty of contributory negligence."
The court disposed of the case by saying:
"It was error to deny the appellant's motion for
judgment on the answers to the interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict.
"Judgment reversed, with instructions to enter
judgment for the defendant on the answers to the
interrogatories."
In the case of Scott v. Kurn et al., (Mo.) 126 S. W. 2d
185, the plaintiff drove a truck distributing gasoline in the
Town of Cuba, Missouri. Under the Missouri law such
operators of gasoline trucks were required to exercise the
highest degree of care in crQssing railway crossings. A
collision occurred when he drove his truck in front of one
I
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of the defendant's passenger trains. There was a sharp
dispute upon the question as to whether or not the defendant railroad company was negligent. As plaintiff approached the track with his truck, there was an oil tank car upon a
switch track about 75 feet west of the highway over which
he was traveling. Plaintiff testified· that he slackened the
speed of his truck and was listening and looking for trains
but admitted that he did not stop his truck before he attempted to drive over the crossing. Because of the rule requiring him to exercise the highest degree of care, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that he should have looked
after he got past the obstruction of the tank car, even
though the distance within which he would have such view
was rather small, and although in the trial court the verdict of the jury was for the defendant, the Missouri Supreme
Court in affirming the judgment for defendant held that
plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The
track was straight for more than 800 feet from the crossing
in the direction from which the train came. There was a distance of 9 feet between the nearest rails of the ·switch
track and the main line track, and the distance from
the bumper of the truck to where plaintiff was seated in
his truck was 7 feet 10 inches. The Supreme Court stated:
I

"* * * We are of the opinion that these physical facts and the evidence of plaintiff convict him
of negligence as a matter of law. It was plaintiff's
duty to exercise the highest degree of care. Ordinary care would have required him to look to the
west for an approaching train. Plaintiff could have
at a glance seen the train in full view, before the
front wheels of his truck reached the south rail of
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the main line track. Note again that there was a
space of nine feet between the rails ; that plaintiff
was sitting in a seat the back of which was less
than eight feet from the bumper of the truck; that
the tank car was more than seventy-five feet to the
west of him. * * *"
In the case at bar the deceased, John T. Toomer, if he
elected to proceed in the face of a warning signal would
be chargeable at least with exercising the highest degree of
care in doing so and not just ordinary care. He had as
much if not more opportunity for view as either of the truck
drivers in the two cases last mentioned and his duty to
exercise extreme care would be as great. He could not pro,
ceed blindly past the freight train standing on the passing
track, nor could he proceed qver the crossing without
slackening his speed so that he would have some view after
he had passed the standing freight. Measurements on Exhibit 1, which is drawn to scale, even assuming that the
front of the engine was at a point where the witness Harmon, son-in-law of deceased, measured, namely 32 feet south
of the end of the planking, will show that had Toomer been
paying any attention at all and had he attempted to look to
the south at all as he passed in front of the freight train,
he would have been able to see past the front of the freight
train and down the main line track for a distance of approximately 200 feet before he had crossed over the passing
track on which the freight train was located and when he
would still have been 15 feet from the main line track. Had
he paid any attention to the. signal and decided nevertheless
to cross in spite of the warning signal, it would have at
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least been his duty to proceed slowly and to keep a vigilant
lookout to the south and have his truck under such control
that he could bring it to a stop in the event a train was a pproaching on the main line track. There is no escape from
the conclusion, under the facts shown by the record in this
case, that in the face of such warning signal Toomer should
be held to have proceeded at his peril.
..

The rule as stated in Corpus Juris was quoted· in the
case of Scott v. /(urn, supra, as follows:
"The presence of standing cars at a crossing
is a notice of danger, calling on the traveler to exercise the greater care which ordinary caution requires ; and where the view of one about to enter
upon a railroad crossing is obstructed by standing
cars, if he attempts to cross without exercising
proper care to look and listen for the purpose of discovering an approaching train as soon as it can be
seen, as immediately after reaching the end of, or
passing, the standing cars which obstruct his view,
and if, where necessary to do so, he fails to stop
to look and listen for the purpose, he is chargeable
with contributory negligence precluding recovery,
notwithstanding negligence on the part of the railroad company in failing to sound the proper warning signals."
If this be true as a general rule, then where there is a
warning signal bei.ng given as was true in the case at bar,
a traveler should be held to proceed at his peril. It must be
remembered that the statute not only requires the driver
to stop but states that he must not proceed "until he can do
so safely." The burden is thus on him not to determine
whether he may have a margin of safety, and not to guess
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or speculate as to whether he might make it across, but that
he "shall not proceed until he can do so safely."
In the case of Shelby v. Southern Pac. Co. et al., (Cal.)
157 P. 2d 442, the California law provided that any vehicle
carrying inflammable liquids should stop not less than 10
nor more than 50 feet from the track, and while so stopped
listen and look in both directions. Failure 'to stop constituted
a misdemeanor. Shelby attempted to drive a truck loaded
with kerosene across the tracks at about 3:30 a.m. and collided with the tender of an engine which was backing over
a spur track across the intersection. Shelby did not bring
his vehicle to a stop as required by the statute. The trial
court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, saying:

"The statutory inhibition of an act by the t1n.position of a penalty for its violation creates an
absolute standard of behavior. In forbidding a kerosene-laden motor truck to cross a railroad track
without first stopping, section 5·76 establishes a rule
of the road which is not debatable. * * * That
such a stricture upon the transportation of specified
commercial cargoes imposes hardships upon drivers
of such motor trucks in traversing a boulevard which
is crossed at frequent intervals by spurs off a main
line railway is no excuse for violating the statute·.
The driver of such a truck is not excusable because
he does not see the track."
The appellate court also stated:

"* * * That the failure of S·helby to· stop
before crossing the track ca.used or con.tributed to
cause the accident is not open to argument. , There
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would have been no collision if the truck had stopped
ten feet south of the point of its attempted cro·ssing."
(Italics ours.)
The last statement is very much in point in the case at
bar. The testimony shows that the contact points. which
would start the wigwag signal to working were 1,650 feet
from the crossing (R. 338). Thus should we assume the
train to have been going at the fastest rate of speed stated
by plaintiff or any of his witnesses-/60 miles an hour-·it
would have taken slightly in excess of 18 seconds for the
train to reach the crossing after the signals started to operate. If the train had been going no faster than the 30
miles an hour which the city ordinance provided, it would
have taken the train only 37 seconds to reach the crossing.
Thus any inconvenience that Toomer may have sqffered
i
in stopping for the signal would have continued for only
slightly more than a half minute, whereas plaintiff's witness Cozzins stated that he stopped,. and waited for two o;r
three minutes before proceeding, not because of any warning from the wigwag signal because he did not observe
such, but he stopped because of the freight train.
Regardless of the speed at which the train may have
been traveling, if it had been going 60 miles an hour it
would have taken only 18 seconds to reach the crossing;
if it had been going 30 miles an hour it would have taken
37 seconds ; and if it had been going 50 miles an hour it ·
would have taken 22· seconds to reach the crossing. Thus
by paraphrasing the last statement given from the Shelby
case, we must conclude: "that the failure of Toomer to
stop before crossing the track caused or contributed to
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cause the accident is not open to argument. There would
have been no collision if he had stopped his truck 10 feet
west of the· point of its attempted crossing."
In Lake Mo-tor Freig·ht Line v. New York Cent. R. Co~.,
(Ind.) 90 N. E. 2d 512, a similar statute was involved, requiring a driver to stop and not to p-roceed until it was
safe to do so. Plaintiff's truck driver was killed in a collision at the crossing. It was contended that the passenger
train involved in the collision was tra~eling in excess of the
25 miles per hour speed limit set by the city ordinance; that
the defendant obstructed the view of the approaching passenger train by having a long freight train on a side track;
that the freight train caused the crossing signal to operate
for some time prior to the collision, causing a. situation
which was misleading and confusing; and also. that the
railroad company violated its own safety rules concerning
protection of the crossing.
The question of whether or not the automatic signal
at the ·crossing was in operation and whether or not the
deceased stopped, and the speed of and whether or not
signals from the train were given, were all in dispute, and
the evidence with respect thereto was conflicting. The
matter was submitted to a. jury on a charge including special interrogatories. 'The jury gave a verdict for the· defendant, and the Indiana Appellate Court in affirming the
trial court's judgment thereon said that the essential facts
to sustain the jury were found in the answers· to special
interrogatories. wherein the jury found that (1) the crossing signal was in operation and ('2') flashing continuously
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until the time of the collision ; ( 3) the crossing bell or gong
was ringing;. (4) the deceased did not stop his truck before

attempting to cross the tracks; ( 5) the freight train was
moving towards the crossing about 150 feet away; and (6)
the whistle on the passenger train was sounded. These facts
having been found by the jury were considered by the appellate court sufficient to sustain the judgment.
In the case at bar (1) there is no dispute that the wigwag was in operation; (2) the red light in the center of
the wigwag was on and S!Vinging back-and-forth; (3) the
crossing bell was ringing; ( 4) the deceased, Toomer, did
not slow down or stop prior to attempting to cross, nor did
he slow down in traveling to the point of collision; ( 5)
there was a dispute as to the location of the freight, but
there is no dispute over the fact that it had not caused the
operation of the wigwag-it could not have done so-and
therefore there was no question in the case at bar of continuous operation of the wigwag that would require a traveler to wait any excess time ; and finally ( 6) the whistle
and bell on the Streamliner were being sounded continuously,
and the whistle at least was- heard by, nearly everyone else
in the vicinity; and this plus the fact that the freight train
gave a warning to travelers by one or more toots of its
whistle.
In the case of Miller et al. v. Chicago, R·. I. & P. Ry.
Co., (S. D.)_ 40 N. W. 2d 324, the plaintiff was driving a
gasoline transport in a southerly direction and was struck
by defendant's engine going east. South Dakota law provided that before crossing the railroad tracks he should
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stop and not proceed until he should ascertain he could do
so safely. There were obstructions to view as he approached
the crossing. There was no wigwag or mechanical signal at
the crossing. When plaintiff arrived at a point 50 to 75
feet north of the crossing, he saw defendant's engine 35 to
45 feet west of the crossing and he thought it was standing stationary. H'e heard no whistle or bell or other warning from the train so proceeded without stopping. As the
front wheels of his. tractor-trailer came upon the rails, he
saw the engine moving down upon him. He had stopped
half a block away where there were industry tracks but
did not stop again for the main line track. He sought to
excuse himself because of traffic following him, ·which by
his stopping might be stopped on the industry tracks, and
also because no signal was given. The trial court submitted
the case to a jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff.
The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court
on the basis that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of
law. We quote from the opinion:

"* * * The duties imposed upon him were
two : first, to stop; second, 'to ascertain when such
crossing can be made in safety.' * * * It must
be conceded that had Miller conformed to the required standard plaintiffs' gasoline transport, loaded
with -inflammable liquid, would have escaped ~he
damaging impact with defendant's engine.

*

*

*

*

*

"The effect of the statute is to require of the
drivers of loaded gasoline transports the utmost
care on their part in avoiding collisions with railroad engines, trains, etc. The law was intended to
eliminate the consequences of disasters involving or
likely to involve the public. To accomplish this aim
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the clear command to the driver of a loaded gasoline
transport is that he first stop and then find out
that he will encounter no danger if he crosses the
tracks. Should we interpret the applicable code provisions as contended by plaintiffs' counsel the result would be a substitute for that which is plainly
written into law and a lower standard of conduct
for drivers of the special class now charged with
the duty to avoid the common danger at railroad
crossings. But a little tinkering with the clause of
the statute. I. E., 'to ascertain when such crossing
can be made in safety,' would reduce the legislative
m,andate to the general rule gov·erning the conduct
of drivers of ordinary mo·tor vehicles." (Italics ours.)
It may be argued that such a case is not applicable
here because there is more danger to· the general public with
a loaded gasoline transport. There is the same danger of
disaster to any individual who attempts to proceed over
a crossing in the face of a mechanical signal, and our law
gives the definite command that he must stop and not
proceed until he can do so safely. It does not say he must
stop and then proceed with due care, or that he can then
proceed even if using the utmost or highest degree of care,
but the law says he must STOP AND NOT PROCEED
UNTIL HE CAN DO SO SA·FE·LY. Clearly, one who neither
stops nor proceeds with caution cannot be excused, and
where Toomer neither slowed nor stopped, but proceeded
over the crossing at 25 or 30 miles an hour, reasonable
minds could not differ but would be compelled to hold him
guilty of negligence as a matter of law.
The Miller case goes on to state:
"* * * 'The command is that the driver shall
not proceed until he knows that to proceed is safe.
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* * *

He had no right to assume what he could
not know.' * * *
"Miller took a chance on a guess and he now
argues that the wrong guess was justifiable. It was
either safe or dangerous for him to go forward. The
law says he was bound to kno-w that it was safe and
that he mus·t stop in order to acquire the krwwledge
of safety. He did not stop and it is obvious that he
entered a path of danger assuming instead of knowing that harm w'ould not result from his traversilng
that path with his extended and heavily laden trans~
port. A brief pause would have enabled him to know
of the danger he assumed no·t to be impending. His
failure to stop and to ascertain that· it was then
soafe for him to cro·ss the tracks fell far short of
the duty the law expressly imposed upon him and
constituted negligence contributing, to the harm
which thereupon and therefrom ensued. (Italics
ours.)
"The judgment appealed from is reversed and
the case remanded with directions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint."
With respect to Mr. Toomer in the case at bar "the
law says he was bound to know that it was safe and that
he must stop in order to acquire the knowledge of safety.
He did not stop and it is obvious that he entered a path of
danger assuming instead of knowing that harm would not
result." We do not know what Toomer assumed, if anything.
There is no evidence that he assumed that the freight was
activating the signal and he would not have been justified
in so assuming and proceeding blindly without slackening
his speed. uA brief paus·e would have enabled him to know
of the danger he assum.ed not to- be impending. His failure
to- stop and to ascertain that it was then safe for kim to
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cross the t1·acks fell far short of the duty the law· expressly
imposed upml. him and constituted negligence contributing
to the harm lchich thereupon. and therefrom ensued."
Quite a number of courts have held it to be contributory negligence as a matter of law where a driver proceeds
over a crossing in the face of an ope·rating mechanical
signal, without reference to the question of whether or
not there is a statute requiring the driver to stop or setting
any criminal penalty for a violation of any law requiring
a stop.
In the case of Larsen v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.,
(Mich.) 227 N. W. 665, the court stated:
"Plaintiff, on his way to work, just before· daylight, driving his automobile on a street in Flint,
came to a railroad crossing of defendant. The crossing was protected by a lighted wigwag and a bell.
\ The positive testimony, against which the negative
testimony made no issue, is that as plaintiff approached the crossing the bell was ringing and the
wigwag was operating, showing a red light~ The
crossing was near a large automobile plant. The
night shift was leaving, and the day shift entering.
Many automobiles were in the street, to which plaintiff, in driving, gave his attention. A sudden movement of an automobile ahead caused plaintiff to
stop, and in doing so he stalled his motor. He stopped
on the crossing. The train was approaching on a
curve. There were cars on a side track. At what
distance from the crossing the enginemen might
have observed plaintiff's peril the record is not
clear. Probably it was nearly 400 feet. Perhaps, on
plaintiff's own testimony, it was much less. At the
conclusion of plaintiff's case a verdict was directed
for defendant. Plaintiff brings error."
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It was argued. that the railroad company should have
been liable under the last clear chance theory, but the Su..
preme c·ourt of Michigan stated: ''The record is barren
of evidence to sustain this theory." On the question of
negligence and contributory negligence, disregarding the
last clear chance, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded:

"*

* * If defendant's negligence be assumed,

plaintiff's contributory negligence precludes recovery.
The record shows an almost total failure of plaintiff
to take precaution for his own safety, and a lack of
proper attention to the crossing and its warnings.
"We find no error.
"Judgment affirmed."
In Nice v. Illinois Cent. R. Co·., (Ill.) 25 N. E. 2d 104,
plaintiff's deceased, a trucker, was killed when his truck
collided with defendant's fast passenger train in the Town
of ;Chestnut, Illinois, just before noon of a F'ebruary day.
There was a mechanical wigwag signal with a bell at the
crossing,· and all witnesses except a daughter of the· deceased testified that it was in operation at the time of
the accident. There were buildings which obstructed the
view of the track as one approached, then a space of about
2,0 fe,et where one could see. Thereafter there were more
obstructions, including a depot building belonging to the
defendant company which obstructed the view until one
was about 15 feet from the main line. The passenger train
involved did not stop in the T'own of Chestnut and was
traveling at the rate of 90 miles. per hour. The grounds of
negligence charged were excess speed of the train, failure
to have a flagman, and also that the wigwag was not properly located for a traveler to see.
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It was contended that the ·Chestnut s·tation agent usually acted as a. flagman at the crossing when fast trains
were due. The Illinois Appellate Court dismissed this. contention briefly by saying:
"The record is bare of any evidence tending to
sho\Y that appellee's intestate had any knowledge of
such custom or relied upon the same. * * *"
In the case at bar there was no evidence that the wigwag either at the time of the accident or at any other tim.e
had operated excessively or that it had operated when a
train was on the passing track, and there was no basis for
contending that Toomer assumed or had any right to assume that the standing freight was operating the wigwag.
All of the evidence is to the contrary, and from the facts
it is conclusive that if Toomer had stopped at all In response to the wigwag-even for five seconds-he would
have saved himself.
In the Nice case, the trial court submitted the matter
to a jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the
Illinois Appellate c·ourt held the deceased to have been
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of, law and
reversed the trial court. The Appellate Court stated:

"* * * in this case we have the picture of
a man driving onto a railroad track in the face of
many warning signals. The wigwag was in operation, the automatic crossing bell was ringing, a 'stop'
sign and a standard railroad sign with crossarms was
placed at the crossing within easy view of the driver,
* * * as well as the horn or whistle and the
automatic bell on the engine sounding continuously.
Most of these warnings were seen and heard by
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many people for a distance of 100 feet and over. To
utterly disregard all of these signals and warnings
seems to us to indicate an entire absence of due
care. * * *
"The fact that from a certain point in the highway ·the view of the· wigwag was obscured to the
driver of an automobile did not in any manner relieve him of the duty to use due care commensurate
with the circumstances. Sunnes v. Illinois Cent. R.
Co., 201 Ill. App. 378.
"* * * The question of due care on the part
of a plaintiff is a question for the jury when there
is any evidence given on the trial which, with any
legitimate inference that may be legally and justifiably drawn therefrom, tends tQ show the use of
due care; but where the evidence, with all legitimate
inferences that may be legally and justifiably drawn
therefrom, does not tend to show due care on the
part of plaintiff, the trial court is justified in instructing the jury to return a verdict for defendant."

In the case at bar there were num-erous warnings which
Toomer could have heeded in addition to the wigwag. The
freight train whistled one or more times, (R. 115, 2·20, 249)
and the Streamliner whistle was sounding continuously and
was heard by all of the men in the cab of the freight engine
as -well as others driving motor vehicles jn the area, some
S·everal blocks to the east of the crossing. Mrs. Sparks
crossed over the main line and then turned around, look.
ing to the· south toward the approaching Streamliner. The
testimony is that she turned and faced the west, but she
said she was watching the approaching Streamliner and
did not even see Toomer until the actual moment of the
collis.ion. Her turning and looking in the direction of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49
approaching train should in itself have given some additional indication to Toomer. There was no claim here that
the wigwag was not properly located, nor any reason given
why Toomer should not have seen or observed it and obeyed
its warning. As was said in the Nice case: "Most of these
warni11oas were seen and heard by many people for a distance of 100 feet and over. To utterly disregard all of
these signals and warnings seems to us to indicate an
entire absence of due care."
In the case of Rothstein v. Boston & Maine R. R.,
(Mass.) 2 N. E. 2d 205, Rothstein was killed in a grade crossing collision with defendant's passenger train on a September night at the "State Street Crossing" in the Town of Newbury, Massachusetts. Three sets of railroad tracks ran
north and south, and the highway crossed from northeast
to southwest. The truck was traveling in a southwesterly
direction and the train was going north. It was admitted
in the case by plaintiff's counsel in his opening statement
to the jury that automatic red flasher lights at the crossing were in operation and flashing their signals as deceased
approached. However, there was testimony to the effect
that trains were shifting back and forth north of the crossing on the side from which the deceased approached. The
engineer and ·fireman testified that the whistle was. blown
and the bell ringing on the passenger engine, but other
witnesses in the vicinity testified that they heard no bell
or whistle, this latter testimony being purely of a negative
characte·r. There was also some testimony that there was
a flagman at the crossing. Some of the witnesses saw him
there after the accident, and some said he had a white
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light and was swinging it in such a way as to invite one
to proceed over the crossing. The trial court denied a motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to a jury,
which returned a verdict for plaintiff. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial court and stated:
"A finding of negligence on the part of the
defendant was not warranted. The evidence in its
aspect most favorable to the plaintiff shows that
his intestate was guilty of contributory negligence
as matter of law. (Cases cited.) The exceptions to
the refusal of the trial judge to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the second
count of the amended declaration must be sustained.
In view of the conclusion reached, the other exceptions of the defendant need not be considered. Judgment is to be entered for the defendant."
In the case of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. D'ay,, (Tex.)
193 S. W. 2d 722, the railroad tracks ran east and west and
the street north and south. There were three tracks from
south to north as follows: a team track, then a passing
track, and then the main line. There was a space of about
10 feet between the passing track and the main line. The
crossing was protected by automatic flashing lights which
would be activated by main line trains within half a mile
of the crossing. The lights, however, would also be activated by cars or trains on the side tracks within 30 feet
of the crossing. Plaintiff approached the crossing from
the south and a train was proceeding east on the passing
track. Plaintiff stopped to wait for the passing train and
as it cleared the crossing by 50 or 60 yards, he said he
looked, saw nothing, and started to cross. The Appellate
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Court said that there was no question but what the flasher
lights \Yere working at the time because the lights were
activated by switching trains and cars on other tracks, and
there was testimony that the lights were flashing nearly
all of the time and that no one paid any attention to them
at all. The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which
returned a verdict for plaintiff. The District Court of
Appeals held the plaintiff to be guilty of negligence as a
matter of law and reversed the trial court. We quote from
the opinion :
''A careful consideration of the testimony as a
whole and the testimony of plaintiff himself compels the conclusion that he either failed to look for
the warning signals or saw and ignored them.
"Crossing signals that fail to function as designed are a source of danger rather than safety.
On the other hand, a disregard for properly functioning signals is a. source of great danger. The
trains are operated in reliance on the motorist heeding such signals and gov·erning· his c·onduct thereby.
(Italics ours.)
"In essence there can be but little difference
between a motorist disregarding the signal of a
flagman not to cross and disregarding an automatic
signal so warning him. No doubt on occasions one
may cross an intersecting railroad track in face of
a flagman's signal not to do so. These signals,
whether given by flagmen or by automatic devices,
should and no doubt do allow a :margin of safety.
In the case of St. Louis B. & M. R. Co., et al. v.
P·aine, Tex. Civ. App., 188 S. W. 1033, this court in
somewhat analogous situation held as a matter of
law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence."
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It is interesting to note that in this case the Texas
court said. there was no general law in Texas making it a
penal offense to cross in the face of a warning light. The
court nevertheless held the plaintiff guilty of negligence as
a matter of law. By the very statement as quoted above
and just referred to, the inference is given, which is in
accord with the general rule, that if there is a penal offense provided by statutory or other law, then violation of
such law is negligence per se.
The law applicable to the case at bar does provide a
penal offense. Se·ction 57-7-2.24 provides that any violation
of the. act is a misdemeanor. Therefore, it was negligence
per se for Toomer to attempt to drive over the crossing in
question in face of the w~gwag light and bell without stopping and without waiting until he could and did determine
that it was safe for him to do so.
We quote further from the opinion of the n·ay case:
"It is true that on either the team or passing
track a standing car or train within thirty feet of
either side of the crossing would activate the lights;
that a train on the main track in approximately
half a mile of either side of the crossing standing
still would activate the lights. However, those lights
were intended to warn of the approach of a_ train in
dangerous proximity to the crossing. This the plaintiff understood. There is, as we have stated, no substantial evidence that the defendants kept these
lights flashing at all times. or any considerable portion of the time; no evidence that they flashed save
when it was necessary to warn the public that the
crossing was dangerous. That other persons. on
other occasions had passed over this crossing in
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disregard of the light, in our opinion has no bearing
on the issue. These grade crossings are common
throughout the entire country. In many cases, no
doubt, they are what might be termed a necessary
evil. The jury found here that this was an extra
hazardous crossing. If there be evidence to sustain
this finding (and same is not attacked) , then this
we think would not excuse the plaintiff from the
exercise of all care. Had he heeded these warning
lights he would not have received the severe injuries
·he did suffer. Even after he had crossed the team
track and the passing track there was time for him
to have still saved himself had he heeded the signal.
It is fair to assume, we think, that as he crossed over
the team track he could see there was no train approaching within dangerous distance on that track;
the same when he crossed the passing track, and
then the only danger indicated was from the main
track, and he deliberately drove on to same in front
of a passing train in the face of a warning that it
was near. In attempting to make this crossing,
under the circumstances, plaintiff recklessly and
carelessly speculated with his own safety. The cases
cited below are deemed to support our finding that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law, and can not recover. (Cases cited.)
The long and short of the matter is that in absolutedisregard of signals to refrain from going upon the
track on account of the imminent approach of a train
plaintiff drove thereon and suffered the serious injuries complained of. His action amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law."
See also Poague v. Kurn, (Mo.) 140 'S. W. 2d 13, where
without reference to any statute the court held the plaintiff
to have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
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of law where he attempted to drive over a crossing in the
face of an operating wigwag signal.
It will be contended by plaintiff that the fact that
there was a stormy condition present would make some
difference. There is s~me dispute with respect to the condition of the storm but the most that can be said with respect to the testimony of any of plaintiff's witnesses is
that one or two of them gave a general conclusion that
"visibility was poor." The other testimony, however, shows
that the storm was not very effective as far as obstructing
any view of travelers approaching the track. Plaintiff's
witness ·Cozzins had no difficulty in seeing the train between
the depot and the water tank. Harmon testified that one
could see at least up to 200 yards (R. 188). The witness
Curtis had no difficulty seeing the train as he was. approaching the crossing, .and he was 5 or 6 blocks away coming from the east part of town in his automobile. He even
saw the train as well as heard its.· whistle when it was a
mile away at the Olsen crossing (R. 146). Regardless of
the condition of the weather, however, rain, fog, snow or
other storm does not excuse one approaching a railroad
crossing from the exercise of due care but instead imposes
upon such traveler the duty of exercising greater care.
In the case of Shaw v. C1hicago & E. I. R. Co·., (Ill.)
7S N. E. 2d 51, the court said:

"* * * It is true that the mist and fog and
rain may have to some extent interfered with her
vision, but if so, this required a greater degree· of
care on her part.''
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That was a case where the trial court had granted judgment for the plaintiff. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court and directed judgment for the defendant.
In the case of Papageorge v. Boston & M. R. R., (Mass.)
57 N. E. 57 6, the court said :
"There was no traffic moving in the vicinity of
the crossing just before the accident except the train
and the truck. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the crossing was a noisy place. The
plaintiff, according to his own testimony, kne·w that
a train was due, and there was nothing to distract
his attention or to prevent him from exercising an
appropriate degree of watchfulness as he approached
the crossing. If his range of vision of the approaching train was restricted by the storm, then he should
have adopted such other reasonable measures as
common prudence dictated in order to ascertain if
it were safe to cross. (Cases cited.) "
See also Negretti v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (Md.) 16
A. 2d 902.
Regardless of the fact that there was a spring storm
in progress, such storm was. not sufficient to obscure a
view of the wigwag, and it would not in any manner affect
the hearing of one situated as T'oomer was had he but
- stopped to listen. The witness Harmon, Toomer's son-inlaw, testified that the visibility was not limited short of
200 yards (R. 188). That would have been sufficient to
enable Toomer to see an approaching train in spite of the
storm had he proceeded slowly over the crossing. He would,
in all events, have been able to see the wigwag, swinging

:~;
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disk and light, and to hear its bell, and if he had stopped
in response thereto, there is no question but what he would
have heard the Streamliner whistle.
-

The trial court should have directed a verdict in favor
of the defendant and against plaintiff and should have
given to the jury defendant's Instruction No.1 as requested.
The court committed reversible error by refusing to do so.

POINT II
THE T·RIAL COURT ERRE·D IN INSTRUCTING AN·D ALLOWING THE JURY T:o FIND
THE DE'FENDANT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
EVEN THOUGH THE JURY SHOULD . FIND
TH'AT THE TRAIN ENTERED THE 'CROSSING AT' A SPEED OF 30 MILES AN H·OUR.
(Statement of Errors No. 3 and No. 5.)
There was testimony from defendant's witnesses. in
the. case at bar from which the jury could have· concluded
tha.t the Streamliner train was not exceeding the speed
limit of 30 miles per hour at the· time· it entered the crossing
(R. 290, 291). Nevertheless, by Instructions No. 10 and
No. 23, and particularly by subparagraph (b) of each of
said instructions, the court authorized the jury to find the
defendant guilty of negligence on the basis of speed alone
even though the train came onto the crossing at 30 miles
an hour, which admittedly was within the speed limit, the
court stating that the jury could so find "in view of all
of the conditions then existing."
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In Instruction No. 13, subparagraph (i), the court
instructed the jury that darkness or stormy weather alone
in the vicinity of the crossing when the wigwag signal was
in operation was not a condition that should be considered
as unusual, and we submit in that particular portion of the
instruction the court was correct. However, such instruction when read with Instructions No. 10, No. 23, and other
portions of Instruction No. 13 is very conflicting.
Let us find out just what were the conditions at the

crossing that could have been referred to by the court in
Instruction No. 10. There was no excess amount of travel
either on the highway or over the rails shown in the evidence, and there was no noise at the crossing either from
industries located in the area-of which there were none-or from other traffic. There were no traffic noises. The
only noise there was, if any, in the vicinity of the crossing
was the noise from the wigwag and ringing bell at the
crossing and such noise as would have been made by the
whistle of the approaching Streamliner or the Streamliner's
bell. There was not even any testimony that the freight
train standing at the crossing made any noise, and all
.. .. three of the occupants in the cab of the freight engine
who would be affected more by the noise, if any, that might
be made by the engine, all heard the signal at the crossing
and the sign·als from the approaching Streamliner.
A speed of 30 miles an hour would not have been in
violation of any city ordinance or any law referred to in
the case at all. It is uniformly held by the courts in these
modern days that speed of a train in and of itself is not
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negligence, and unless there is a failure to sound signals
on an approaching train or unless there is noise at a cr<>ssing or something at the crossing which would render ordinary signals indistinct s_o that they would not be heard,
or unless the crossing is shown to be unusually hazardous
by reason of excess traffic thereon, it is not negligence to
run such train at any speed the railroad company may
choose.
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.)
47 N. E. 2d 615, the accident in question occurred at a
crossing in a residential portion of a town of 600 population. The court held :
"Speed of itself never constitutes negligence· in
the absence of a limiting statute or ordinance. We
must reach the same conclusion as the court did in
Union Traction ·Co. v. Howard, Adm'·r, 1910, 173
Ind. 335, 340, 90 N. E. 764, 765, in which it is said:
'We think there is but one act of negligence alleged;
that it requires the concurrence of a high and dangerous rate of speed, coupled or concurring with a
failure to give warning, to constitute the negligence
charged.' * * *"
In State v. Poe et al., (Md.) 190 A .. 231, Poe was driver
of a bus transporting a group of school children returning
at about 11:30 P.M., when in crossing the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad tracks in the Town of Rockville the bus was struck
by a Baltimore & Ohio passenger train traveling 58 or 59
miles per hour. There were no flashing lights at the crossing, but there· was a gong or crossing bell which was in
operation at the time of the accident, and there was a red
lantern which a. flagman had left burning there. The plain-
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tiff's testimony as to lack of signals both at the crossing
and from the train \Vas all negative, and the Maryland Ap..
pellate Court said that in the face of positive· testimony
to the contrary, it did not even raise a question for the
jury. It was raining at the time of the accident, but the
Appellate ~Court said that if the driver had stopped he
would have been able to hear the signals.
With respect to the speed of the train the Maryland
Appellate ·Court referred to the fact that there were automatic bells ringing at the crossing, plus the whistle on the
locomotive which was sounded and the locomoti~e bell
which was ringing, and the court said:

"* * * All these precautions were taken and
all these warnings were given at the time of the
accident, and they furnished adequate and opportune warnings of approaching trains, no matter
their speed. The crossing was one where a traveler
would anticipate the passage of fast trains. It follows that, under these circumstances, a recovery cannot be had on the speed of the train. (Cases cited.)"
(Italics ours.)
In Plough v. Baltimore & Ohio, R. Co., 172 F'. 2d 396·,
the Federal Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit reversed
the trial court for submitting' an instruction to a jury which
· · · · allowed the jury to find the railroad company guilty of
negligence on the question of speed alone when there was
no statutory regulation as to speed and where the question
of speed was not tied in with the failure to give proper
signals.
In the case at bar there is no dispute as, to proper
signals having been given from the train. In addition to
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that fact the crossing was protected by a wigwag containing a. swinging light and a bell, yet the court by Instruction No. 10 allowed the jury to find the defendant negligent
regardless of warnings and signals even though the jury
should find that the speed of the train was not in excess
of 30 miles an hour and therefore not in violation of any
law or ordinance.
The pictures, Exhibits 3, 6 and G, show that while this
crossing is in the edge of Cokeville it also borders on country area, and with the wigwag protecting the crossing could
be considered similar to an ordinary country crossing.
In Canion v. Southern Pac. Co., (Ariz.) 80 P. 2d 397,
with res.pect to a charge of excess speed, the court stated:

"* * * It is too well known for us to refuse
to take judicial notice of the fact that trains of this
nature are universally scheduled to travel at a high
rate of speed, and partciularly so in sparsely settled
and outlying country districts. If such speed in such
districts were of itself negligence, there can be no
doubt that the various railroad commissions, which
are so zealous in guarding the rights of the public,
would have prohibited a speed so universally employed. We are clearly of the opinion that the admitted speed of the train at the time and under the
·circumstances was not, as a matter of law, negligence unless it were shown affirmatively that there
were some circumstances existing at the time which
should have caused the engineer to slacken his speed.
There was no evidence of this nature."
The testimony in the case at bar shows that Cokeville
had a population of approximately 500 people (R. 195),
and in the main, people who went back and forth over the
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~crossing

were ranchers. The witness Harmon stated that
~approximately half of the people of Cokeville lived to the
~west of the crossing, but the pictures above referred to
: show the contrary and show that the crossing is. in the
~extreme west edge of town.
In the case of Nice v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (Ill.) 25 N.
E. 2d 10~, the accident occurred in the Village of Chestnut,
~Illinois, which contained about 300 people. In that case
::the train was going 90 miles an hour, and with respect to
rng~ a charge of exceed speed, and in holding the driver of the
~vehicle involved to have been guilty of negligence as a mat. ter of law, the Illinois Appellate Court stated:
h

.....
r.~

~ 1~

"It is hard for this Court to see in this day and
age, and under the circumstances proven in this
case, how it can determine that it is negligence per
se to operate a train at the rate of 90 miles per hour
through the Village of Chestnut."

See also Carter v. Pennsylvamia R. Co., (Sixth Circuit
-~_Ct. of App.) 172 F. 2d 521.

... -

__.

It was prejudicial and reversible error for the court
~~-under the facts shown by the record in this case to allow
~;the
jury to find the defendant guilty of negligence if it
~~
~r operated the train over the crossing at 30 miles an hour.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMIT-TING
TO T·HE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NOT THE DEFENDANT ADEQUATELY
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WARNED T RAVELERS ON THE HIGHWAY
AP~PROA~C·HING OR INTENDTNG TO USE THE
FIRST STREET CROSSING. (Statement of Errors Nos. 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.)
1

There is no dispute in the evidence in this case with
respect to the warnings which were actually given and
t:qere is not sufficient in the record from which the jury
could have found otherwise than that the whistle on the
Streamliner passenger train was sounding almost continuously as it approached the crossing, the bell on the Streamliner was operating, and the wigwag was. swinging backand-forth with the light in the center on red and the bell
in the mechanism ringing. In addition, the freight train
standing south of the crossing sounded one or more blasts
of its whistle. WE REPEA~J\ THIS ~EVIDENCE IS NOT
CONTRADICTED. There were some of the witnesses who
did not hear the bell on the Streamliner engine, but none
attempted to say that it did not ring. N·ot all of the witnesses heard all of the whistles on the Streamliner, but
several-both of plaintiff's and defendant's. witnesses-testified to hearing several whistles from the Streamliner.
Even the witness Mr. Harmon, who saw the· Streamliner
momentarily and attempted to judge its speed, did not
sa.y that the Streamliner had not whistled. In the face of
this evidence, there was no basis whatsoever for the court
to submit to the jury any question as to whether or not
the defendant had "adequately warned" drivers of motor
vehicles of the approach of said train.
It was not at any time claimed that railroad traffic
over the crossing was excess, and in fact the amount of
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I.

'

~railroad

traffic over the crossing was not shown at all.
.. It was alleged in the complaint that First Street carried a
... large amount of vehicular traffic, but the only testimony
with respect to that wa~ that 10 or 15 vehicles. an hour
~ passed back-and-forth over the crossing (R. 201). This
~would mean approximately only one vehicle in five minutes.
......

I•'

'-.:

We have already referred to the fact that there were
-~- no industries surrounding the crossing which would create
-__ any noise, and there were no facts in evidence which would
~n tend to indicate that the Streamliner whistle could not or
i~ would not have been heard had Toomer only stopped to
·~-listen. Clearly, there could not by any stretch of the imagi. nation be anything gleaned from the records in this case
-:·as to why Toomer did not or could not have seen or heard
:::.:the wigwag signal at the crossing. If there had been any
~~dispute in the evidence concerning the wigwag or bell at
___ the crossing, or if there had been any dispute concerning
-.·-·signals that were given by the Streamliner engine, then
~the question might have been different and might possibly
~have
been submitted to the jury.
,--::
__ ,
~

,"";

.-The question of signals or warnings in addition to
:e:those usually given is only material when the crossing is
:==·alleged to be and there is proof that it is an exceptionally
if:or unusually dangerous one, and where the normal warn:;; ings usually given at a crossing would be difficult to be
~:heard by a person using due care, but where there is neither_
pleadings nor proof to that effect and it is shown that in
ih': addition to normal signals a wigwag light and bell is in
:~toperation at the crossing, such warnings are a's a matter
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of law sufficient, and submitting the question of additional
warnings, or allowing the jury to speculate concerning additional warnings, constitutes prejudicial error.

As was said in the case of State v. Poe et al., (Md.) 190
A. 2,31, supra, "All these precautions. were taken and all ~
these warnings were given at the time of the accident,~~
and they furnished adequate and opportune warnings of i
arpproa.ching· trains, no matter their speed." (Italics ours.)

In the case of Markar v. New York, N . H. & H. R. Co.,
77 F. 2d 283, a crossing collision occurred after dark. It
was shown that there were no obstructions to view and ·
in daylight one approaching the track could see along it
for 1,000 feet. However, the accident happened after dark :
and it was claimed that the train had no headlight and
did not ring a bell or sound a whistle; also that the train
was running at excessive speed. In addition to these claims,
it was charged that the crossing was extra-hazardous and
was not adequately protected. It appeared in evidence that
there were flasher lights on one side of the highway only,
although having lights facing in each direction along the
highway. There was no bell at the crossing. The trial court
submitted the case to a jury, which returned a verdict for
plaintiff. The F'ederal ·Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court stating: "It was error to permit the jury to find
negligence based upon an insufficiently protected crossing." We quote the following from the opinion:
1

1

1

!

"Appellant complains that the court should not
have permitted the jury to find as an element of:
negligence that the crossing was insufficiently protected. The blinker at the crossing was installed in
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19'23 pursuant to the order of the Commission, and
the appellees claim that while it might have been
sufficient at that time, with the increase in traffic
over this highway it was insufficient at the time of
the accident. The highway is a main route and a
short cut to Hartford, New Haven, and shore points,
and was a road used by four bus lines and many
school buses. It was contended by the appellees that
appellant should have known that motorists are often
behind large trucks, as appellees were at the time
in question, thus making it impossible to see the
light on the blinker at the right-hand. side of the
highway, and that there should have been another
blinker on the opposite side as they proceeded. In
other words, that on a much traveled highway resulting in a dangerous crossing, blinker lights on
both sides of the highway, or in the middle of the
highway, or at a greater height above the highway,
might be found to be necessary by a jury, or that an
electric warning bell, flagman, or gates were necessary. The proof upon the trial may be supplemented
sufficiently to indicate heavy traffic and such use
of the highway as to permit a jury to find an extra..:hazardous crossing requiring a higher degree of
protection, either by means of an electric bell, gates.,
or flagman. (Citing cases.) But the present rec-ord
does not justify such a finding. * * * (Italics
ours.)
"There passed over this single-track crossing,
eight schedule trains a day. It was located in the
country, three miles from the city of Willimantic.
Approaching the track, the traveler had no obstruction and could see in either direction a distance of
1,000 feet. In the cases we have referred to, there
was some obstruction to vision. Moreover, the amount
of travel over this crossing, as disclosed by evidence,
is indefinite and would not permit a jury to find
that more protection was necessary than that which
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.concededly existed at the crossing. It is estimated
that traffic increased 15 per cent over that which
prevailed when the Public Service Commission issued its order as to signals at the crossing. What
it was then or what it is now, was not proved. It
was error to permit the jury to find negligence based
upon an insufficiently protec'ted crossing." (Italics
1
ours.)
In the case at bar we are told that ·Cokeville had only
500 inhabitants, and this apparently included the· ranchers
in the outlying districts. There were no near centers of
large population such as Hartford or New Haven. The evidence as to travel showed that it was not nearly so great as
'
in the Markar case, in which the court said that with proper
evidence it could be shown that additional protection was
needed, "but the present record does not justify such a
finding."
In the case of Schaffer v. New Yor-k Cent. R. Co.,
(Ohio) 34 N. E. 2d 792, a train _traveling 50 to 55 miles
per hour came around a curve 500 feet from the crossing.
There was at the crossing the regular crossarm sign, and
in addition, automatic flasher lights, which. were operating
at the time of the accident. It was contended that the railroad should have provided a watchman or gates., or other
more effective warning. The trial court directed a verdict
for the defendant, and the Ohio Appellate Court in affirming the judgment said :
"So far as this record shows, the defendant had
provided all of the warning and signaling devices at
this crossing the law required. Having provided the
cross sign and the flashers, did ordinary care require
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more? Certainly not as to the decedent. The flashers told the driver and occupants of the Gee auto
that they were at a railroad crossing, and, with the
whistle, that a train was approaching. A watchman
or gates could have furnished them no more information.
"In respect to signs or signals at the crossing
and warnings from the locomotive, negligence of the
defendant was not proven.
\

*
*
*
*
*
"* * * 'Varning signs and signals such as
existed at this time and place having been provided,
those operating that train were warranted in assuming that the traveling public, having been informed of its approach, would yield to it the right
of way over the crossing. If this is not true and
such a train must keep its speed where it can be
stopped in a few feet, the essential and practical
purpose of railroads is lost."
The Ohio Appellate Court held the decedent to have
been bound by the warning that the automatic signal given
and added:
"* * * With this information, when he went
upon the track he knew he was taking a chance and
he did so at his own risk. As a matter of law he
was guilty of negligence which either caused or
contributed to cause the fatality."

In subparagraph (f) of Instruction No. 13, the court
instructed the jury that in determining whether the defendant adequately warned users of the First Street ·crossing of the approach of the train, they could consider whether
.an ordinary prudent man under the circumstances and in
the position of -John T. Toomer would have believed from
the location and movement of the freight train that the
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freight train and the freight train alone was activating the
wigwag signal and was blowing all the whistles, if any,
and sounding all the bells, if any, that could be heard. Such
an instruction was error and highly prejudicial. The plaintiff attempted to produce testimony from one or more of
his witnesses that they thought the wigwag would work
when a train was on the side track (R. 117, 123., 124, 126).
The court sustained objections to such testimony, and as a
result the only evidence in the record is that the wigwag
was not operated by trains on these side tracks and never
had so operated it, and at least some of plaintiff's witnesses
knew that these tracks were passing tracks and used for
that purpose, and they were so stated in the complaint itself when filed (R. 2). Toomer had lived by the track for
10 years. He may have had actual knowledge, as others. did,
that the side tracks were used only for passing and that
only main line trains activated ·the signal. At any rate,
there is no evidence as to what he might have known or
what he might have assumed. There was no evidence that
there had ever been any excess opeTation of these signals.
There was no testimony that anyone had ever seen the
wigwag activated if nothing was on the main line. There
was no evidence that trains were in the habit of standing
with the lights operating continuously or tor any excess
period of time. In spite of these facts and after the court
had prohibited witnesses from testifying as to what their
understanding or assumption might have been as to when
the signals would work, the court nevertheless submittep
this instruction to the jury and let the jury thereby and
without any evidence whatsoever speculate on the question
I
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as to whether or not Toomer might have assumed that the
freight train was activating the sig·nal. There was no basis
in the evidence introduced in the case which would justify
submission of any such instruction to the jury. This. allowed the jury the wildest type of speculation without a
scintilla of evidence to go on and was prejudicial error of
the worst sort.
In subparagraph (g) of Instruction No. 13, the court
allowed the jury to speculate upon the question as to whether
or not an ordinary prudent man in John T!oomer's position would have believed there was sufficient time to safely
cross all of the tracks. Such an instruction was not proper
under the facts of this case. There was no testimony that
Toomer knew how long the flasher light would operate and
how long it would take for any train to reach the crossing
or what he could base any question of time on, assuming
time to cross the tracks, and in the face of evidence concerning the wigwag signal it was highly improper because
the law does not allow such a person to speculate or determine whether he can cross the tracks safely without
first stopping his vehicle in response to the warning. Instructions must be applicable to the facts of the instant case,
and the facts in the instant case were conclusive that the·
wigwag signal was in operation. The statute which applied
thereto set an absolute standard of conduct and that was
that Toomer should have stopped and then not proceeded
until he could have done so safely. If the evidence had
s·hown that the light at the crossing had been working for
some excessive period of time, and if the evidence had
shown that Toomer stopped and waited and after a reason-
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able length of time proceeded cautiously over the tracks,
then it may have been proper for the court to submit a
question to the jury as to whether a reasonable man after
stopping would have concluded that it was safe to cross.
BUT SUCH AN INSTRU~CTION WAS NOT P·ROPER UNDER THE FA!CTS IN THE C'ASE AT BAR.
If the evidence had shown that the wigwag signal had
been in the habit of operating excessively or for long periods of time when no traffic was moving, and if the evidence had shown that as a result of such excessive ope·ration
of the signal people generally had formed a habit of crossing in spite of the signal, there might then have been a
proper basis for the court to allow the jury to speculate as
to whether a reasonable rna~ would have, under the provisions of the statute, determined that it was safe to cross
(although the Texas Court held it improper to submit it
to a jury even under such circumstances in Texas & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Day, supra.) ; but under the facts of this case
and the applicable statutes, Toomer was. bound to stop: and
not to proceed until he could do so safely. The statute in
effect said a reasonable person should stop and not proceed
until he could do so safely, and it was prejudicial and reversible error for the court to allow the jury to find that
Toomer acted as a reasonable man in violating a penal
statute which set out, as this statute does, an absolute standard of care.
The court instructed the jury that they could find
defendant negligent for failing to adequately warn users
of the First Street crossing if they found (h) lack of warning devices other than the wigwag, and in subparagraph
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(i), if they found the lack of a watchman at the crossing.
What evidence is there which would require "warning devices other than the wigwag, the existence of the tracks,
and the presence of the freight train?" · There is not one
bit of evidence and no issue raised by the pleadings to show
that this was an unusually hazardous crossing requiring
other than normal signs erected at the crossing, and in spite
of such lack of pleadings and evidence, it is undisputed that
the defendant railroad company had nevertheless installed
and maintained an electric wigwag s.ignal with a swinging
red light and a bell, all of which were in operation. If there
had not been such automatic protection at the crossing, the
pleadings and evidence were not sufficient to show this to
be an extra-hazardous crossing. The only thing unusual
at the crossing at all was the presence of the freight train,
which admittedly constituted some obstruction, but the
wigwag was ample protection with respect to that, and except for the freight train there was no obstruction to view.
There was no excess traffic and no noise rendering ordinary
signals indistinct or hard to hear, and there was nothing
that under ordinary circumstances would require even the
presence of a wigwag. The wigwag was there and it was
there for the purpose· of warning travelers of trains approaching on the main line while trains might be located
on the passing tracks. Again we say, there was no dispute
as to proper signals having been given by the approaching
train and no reason for Toomer not to have heard them
had he listened. If the truck was making a noise, that did
not excuse him and he could have stopped and lowered his
windows. All this, disregarding the question of the wig-
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wag, which in and of itself was more than sufficient additional warning. There was no justification in either pleadings or evidence to warrant the court in allowing the jury
to speculate as to whether the railroad company should
have furnished some "warning device connected with the
crossing other than the· wigwag." Even a. f:lagm.an could
not have given a more effective warning to an approaching truck than a swinging disk with a red light and a warning bell. Had there been a flagman he more than likely
would have had to get out of the way to keep from getting
run over, as has been the case in some similar situations.
As a concluding paragraph to Instruction 13, the court
tells the jury; that if- t~ey find that an ordinary prudent
careful person would not have been aware of the danger,
then the defendant was negligent for not having adequately
warned the deceased. The court says nothing about whether
or not Toomer would have been guilty of contributory negligence under the ·circumstances, but infers that if the
jury should find that he was not thus adequately warned,
he would not have been guilty of negligence.
There would have been much more justification for
submitting such an instruction to a. jury in a. case like
Nabrotsky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 103 Utah 274, 135
P. 2d 115; or in the case of Nuttall v. Denver & R. G. W. R.
Co., 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; or in the recent case of Frank
v. McCarthy, 112 Utah 422, 188 P. 2d 737, where there was
no mechanical signal at the crossing. The facts in the case
at bar were stronger against the deceased Tbomer and
would convict him of contributory negligence as a matter
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of law to a greater degree than would be true in either of
the three cases just cited, and under the circumstances there
is and was no justification for the court to submit to the·
jury the question as to whether or not Toomer as an ordinary prudent careful person should have been aware of
the danger when the evidence '\Vas so overwhelming as to
signals having been given and as to his lack of caution.
The court by Instruction No. 13 disregarded the law
that has been set forth by this court in many of its cases,
as well as by other courts, to the effect that "what constitutes ordinary care under such circumstances, or, as it is
sometimes termed, 'the measure of duty,' is pre~cribed by
law, and therefore is not left to the whim or caprice of
either court of jury'' (Butler v. Payne, 5·9 Utah 383:, 203
P. 869). By such an instruction the court left it to the jury
to decide according to its own whim what conduct should
or should not constitute negligence, regardless of statute
and regardless of what the law might otherwise be. The
statute applicable in this case set an absolute standard of
conduct. Because others may have violated the law the
court cannot say that Toomer would be relieved of the resulting consequences if he violated it. The statute said he
must stop and not proceed until he can do so safely, and
where the evidence conclusively shows he did not stop and
that he did not even proceed cautiously, it is prejudicial
and reversible error for the court to so allow the jury to
speculate on whether a reasonable person would have so
violated the law and on such basis excuse Toomei_' for doing
so. If such an instruction would ever be proper, it would
have to be based upon some evidence showing operation of
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the signal in question in such a manner that it could not
be relied upon. There would have to be some evidence that
people in the vicinity, including the deceased, knew of the
unreliability of the signal, and there would have to be some
evidence showing that Toomer had at least stopped and
then proceeded cautiously over the crossing. In absence
of any such evidence, the only conclusion that could properly be reached from the record in this case is that the
statute set an absolute standard by which all men must be
guided and controlled, and if they fall short of the standard
thus set, they must know that they would suffer a criminal penalty and any other attendant consequences.
In Instruction No. 12 the court allowed the jury to
find the defendant negligent if an ordinary prudent engineer would not have driven an engine onto the crossing
at a speed as great as 30 miles an hour even though he had
in all respects complied with the law. Here again the court
disregarded standards of care which have been set by this
and other courts with respect to the operation of such
trains. ,C'ourts, have repeatedly said that engineers or others
in the operation of trains, even if they see vehicles approach- ·
ing, do not need to slow down or stop the trains but are
entitled to assume that approaching vehicles will comply
with the law and stop and give way to the approaching
train. The trial court under such circumstances, with an
open crossing, would have instructed the jury, not that
the engineer would be entitled to so assume, but that the
jury could by their own whim or caprice decide whether
a reasonable engineer would or would not stop. The law
has been definitely set to the contrary.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

75

In the case of Lang v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (Wis.)
40 N. W. 2d 548, where there were box ears placed near the
street at the crossing, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
stated that the railroad employes had a right to assum.e
that persons driving a truck over the intersection would
obey the statutory command and stop not less than 20 or
more than 40 feet from the crossing.
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.)
47 N. E. 2d 615, the court said:
"* * * It must have been the legislative conclusion that, of course, all travelers would take notice
of the warning afforded by mechanical signals."
In the giving of Instructions Nos. 10, 12:, 13 and 23-,
the court disregarded standards of care which have been
set in railroad cases for years past and allowed the jury
to speculate and set up, according to their own whim or
caprice, what they would think a standard of eare should
be in this particular case, in spite of the fact_ and in face
of the fact that there was a direct statute applicable to the
facts of the case which set an absolute standard of care
and provided a criminal penalty for violation. In doing so
the court committed prejudicial and reversible error and
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL 'COURT ERRED IN INSTIRUCTING THE JUR.Y THAT THERE WAS A PRESUMPTION THAT T'OOMER WAS IN THE EXERCISE OF ORDINARY CARE IMMEDIAT'ELY
PRIOR TO THE TIME OF T'HE COLLISION.
(Statement of Error No. 14.)
There is no presumption of due care on the part of a
deceased when the only evidence in the case shows con-
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elusively that the deceased was not in the exercise of due
care. Such a presumption is. available in the absence of
evidence showing what may have been done by the· deceased
or what care may have been exercised by him. It is a presumption induJged in in the absence of evidence. But where
there is evidence in a case as to the actions of the deceased
or the amount of care exercised by him, then there is no
presumption operative and it is error on the part of the
court to instruct the jury that there is such a presumption
when the evidence shows to the contrary.
This rule has been recently and effectively stated by
this court in the case of King v. D-enver & Rio· Grande
Western R. Co., ______ Utah ______ , 211 P. 2d 833. In that case
a brakeman riding a car on a flying switch was killed, and
on appeal it was contended it would be presumed that the
deceased was engaged in the performance of his duties and
in the exercise of due care.
In the performance of his duties and exercising due
care, the deceased would have been obligated to manipulate
the brake upon the moving car. He was not in view of
witnesses all the time, but at no ~ime was he seen to be
operating or attempting to operate the brake, and with
respect to this presumption this court said :
"The presumption that Thomas was engaged in
the performance of his duties and in the exercise
of due care for his own safety at the time of his
death has not come into being because the evidence
that Thomas at every point where observed, was
making no attempt to apply the brake until within
fifty feet of the end of the bin. At that time it was
too late to stop the cars in the remaining distance
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even if the brake were in perfect working order.

* * *"
In the case of Whiffin v. Union Pac. R. Co. et al.,
(Idaho) 89 P. 2d 540, in connection with the question of
this presumption, the Idaho court, quoting an earlier case
with approval, stated:
"The respondent relies largely upon an indul·
gence of the presumption that the jury was at liberty to infer ordinary care and diligence on the part
of the decedent from all of the circumstances of the
case-his character and habits and the natural instincts of self-preservation-to hold the verdict. This
can only be done in the absence of direct proof of
the facts. 111e circumstances of the case alone are
sufficient to rebut the presumption invoked. * * *"
POINT V
UNDER THE EVIDENCE IN TffiS CASE T'HE
SPEED OF THE STREAMLIN·ER TRAIN WAS
NOT A PROXIMAT'E CAUSE OF T'HE AC~CI
DENT AND THE ·C·OURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO .. 4. (Statement of Error No.
15.)

There is no evidence in the case that the deceased ever
saw the Streamliner train in question. It is clear that he
could not at any time have observed it so as to appraise
,its speed. If he heard the signals but nevertheless assumed
that he would have time to get across, he would be guilty
thereby of contributory negligence without question.
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In the case of Vance v. Union Pac. R. Ca., (Kan.) 298
P. 765, the trial court granted a nonsuit, or rather, sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. The train in
question was operated at 20 miles, an hour, whereas a city
ordinance pTovided a speed limit for trains of 10 miles an
hour. The Supreme Court of Kansas in affirming the trial
court stated:
"We think the court was warranted in sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. The only
negligence shown, and apparently the only one upon
which plaintiff relies or has any ground to rely
upon, is that the train was running at a speed in
excess of that prescribed in the city ordinance. It
is a well-established rule of law that the violation
of a city ordinance regulating the rate of speed of
trains within a city imposes no liability on the railroad company for an injury to others unless the
violation was the efficient or proximate cause of the
injury. * * *

*

*

*

*

•

"In regard to the excessive speed of the train,
it appears that, when the engineer discovered that
the driver was recklessly driving upon the track,
he used all appliances and care to a vert the collision,
and it further appears that, even if the railroad
train had been running at a ten-mile rate, the speed
permitted by the city ordinance, the collision would
have occurred due to the situation at the time, and
the negligent approach to the crossing by the driver.
* * *"
It cannot be said that if the train had been going only
30 miles an hour when Toomer drove in front of it he would
not have been killed. Such a fatality is just as probable
and as much a matter of common experience when a train
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may be traveling 40, 50 or 60 miles an hour. The speed of

the train was only a condition present, and the· proximate
cause was Toomer's driving in front of the train at the
time and place.
This court recognized such a rule in Horsley v. Robinson et a.l., 112 Utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592. In that case it
was charged that defendant's bus was traveling too fast.
This court said:
"The mere happening of the accident of course
does not prove that the defendants were negligent.
Nor does the fact that the rate of speed at which
they traveled brought them at the s.cene of the accident at the time the Reinhardt car went out of control and into the course of travel of the bus, becaus,e
that is something that they could not anticipate and
guard against. * * *"
Had it been the occupant of the Reinhardt car involved
in the action, the court would thus have concluded that the
speed of the bus was not the proximate cause of the collision.
However, suit was by a passenger on the bus, and this court
held:

"* * * Of course, if this bus had been traveling at the rate of 5 miles per hour the collision with
the Reinhardt car would not have injured the plaintiff because at that rate the bus being driven against
a small car moving in the same direction would not
create sufficient jar to injure the passengers.
* * *"
The situation was different in the ·case at bar and a
speed of 30 miles per hour within the city ordinance limit

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

80
would have made no difference as far as Toomer's injuries
and death were concerned.
In O'Malley v. Eagan et al., (Wyo.) 2: P. 2d 1063~, cited
by this court in Horsley v. Robinson, it was stated:
"Speed, considered by itself, cannot, accordingly,
be said to have necessarily contributed to the acci..
dent in question. That is clear when we bear in
mind that if the defendant had traveled at a lawful
rate of speed, but had started a few minutes earlier,
he would have been at the place of accident just the
same. The speed, therefore, eonsidered by itself, may
have been merely a condition of the accident, and
remote in the chain of causation, from which no lia..
bility arose. * * *"
See also Whalen v. Dunbar et al., (R. 1.) 115· A. 718,
wherein the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated:

"* * * If it should be conceded that the defendant's ·automobile at the time the emergency was
created was proceeding at a rate of speed in excess
of the statutory limit, there was no testimony of
probative value showing or tending to show that the
accident would not have happened if the defendant's
automobile had been proceeding at the rate of 2~
miles per hour, or even at a much less rate of speed,
or th~t the speed of the defendant's automobile in
any way entered into the cause of the collision.
"As the speed of the defendant's automobile in
no wise contributed to the accident, the rate of speed
is immaterial, and liability cannot be predicated
upon the speed of said automobile. (Cases cited.)"
In Lynch v. Pennsylvania R. Co. et al., (Ohio) 194 N. E.
31, the deceased approached the crossing at 25 to 35 miles
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per hour. There was an automatic crossing bell maintained
at the crossing by the railroad company, and it was ringing and the locomotive whistle was sounded. There was
a watchman on the far side of the crossing and he gave
no signal to either stop or proceed. It was contended that
the inaction of the watchman amounted to an invitation to
proceed. A city ordinance limited the speed of trains to
10 miles per hour, and the train was exceeding that speed.
Deceased did not attempt to slow down until 25 feet from
the crossing, and then, seeing the train, skidded on the oiled
street and collided with the engine. The trial court directed
a verdict for the defendant and the Ohio Appellate 'Court
affirmed the trial court stating :
"Now it is claimed that the railroad company
was negligent in operating the locomotive at a speed
greater than 10 miles an hour, as provided in the
ordinances of the city. This excess of speed, which
was stated to be about 20 miles per hour, could not
have been the proximate cause of the death of the.
decedent.''
In the case of Whiffin v. Union Pac. R. Co. et al., (Idaho) 89 P. 2d 540, wherein the plaintiff had pleaded the facts
rather fully, the trial court sustained a general demurrer
and the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court. \
The deceased had driven over a double track in the 'City
,of Caldwell in the face of an automatic wigwag and lights.
She had stopped for a .:passing freight train going one direction and started immediately· as the freight passed and
was struck by a passenger train going in the other direction on the next track. She assumed the operation of the
flashing lights was caused by the departing freight, and
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it was alleged that a flagman or gates should have been
provided. It was also charged that the passenger train was
passing at an excessive speed, greatly in excess of the 25
miles an hour provided by the ·City of Caldwell. The Idaho
Supreme Court wrote an exhaustive opinion citing cases
not only from the Idaho courts but from other states. The
court gave an interesting discussion of the question of
contributory negligence emphasizing the duty to ·observe
caution and to look and listen in such a way as to make
looking and listening effective.
On the question of the speed of the train in excess of
the ordinance limit the Idaho Supreme Court said:
"The speed of the train, though in excess and
therefore in violation of the ordinance, is not shown
to have 'been as such, a proximate cause of the accident, because it is alleged deceased did not know
of the approach of the passenger train, hence perforce she did not rely on its approach at a legal
speed permitting her to cross in front of it, and
the rule in Fleenor v. Short Line R. 'Co., supra, does
not assist the complaint. Nor are facts alleged
which show that if the train had traveled at a legal
rate, the accident would not have happened at all,
or deceased been merely injured and not killed. No
allegation states the distance of the city limits east
of the crossing, how fast the passenger train was
going, the exact relative position of the west end
of the caboose on the freight train and front of pas..
senger engine and consequent increasingly clear
angle of vision to deceased before and as she started
onto the north, middle or south track, and thus any
attempt to determine how the speed as such contributed to the accident by considering the application of any analysis of the above essentials absent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83
from the complaint, or that a less speed would not
have killed deceased, leads to mere speculation and
conjecture. (Cases cited.)
"Deceased's negligence as contributing to the
accident must be considered in the light of the circumstances as they existed, not as they might have
been, so likewise must the speed of the passenger
train, so far as the present complaint is concerned.
Henderson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. ~co., 314
Mo. 414, 284 S. W. 788, 793."
The plaintiff on appeal argued:
"'If the train had not been running at an unlawful rate of speed, her life would have been
spared.'"
But the Idaho Supreme Court answered:
"This is mere assertion, not argument or explanation. Death resulted because deceased most
unfortunately drove her car in front of this. train,
which had a right to be on the track, and could have
traveled no other place, which being at that point,
at that time, could not have helped but strike deceased, and when she had herself proceeded to the
place of danger. * * *''
See also Holtkamp v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., CM:o.)
234 s. w. 1054.
The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant~s
requested Instruction No. 4.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO.
5 AS REQUESTED BECAUSE THE CROSSING WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE UNUSUALLY
HAZARDOUS. (Statement of Error No. 16.)
We have already referred to the fact that the pleadings
and evidence are wanting in showing hazards at this cross-
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ing which would warrant additional protection or additional
warnings. The case which is cited most and has been cited
by nearly all jurisdictions over the country with respect to
hazardous crossing is the case of 'Grand Trunk Railway
Company v. lves, 144 U. S. 408, 36 L. Ed. 485, 12 Sup. Ct.
679. In that case the Supreme Court said:

"* * *

It seems, however, that before a jury
will be warranted in saying, in the absence of any
statutory direction to that effect, that a railroad
company should keep a flagman or gates at a crossing, it must be first shown that such crossing is
more than ordinarily hazardous : as, for instance,
that it is in a thickly populated portion of a town
or city; or, that the view of the track is obstructed
either by the company itself or by other objects
proper in themselves; or, that the crossing is a much
travelled one and the noise of approaching trains is
rendered indistinct and the ordinary signals difficult to be heard by reason of bustle and confusion
incident to railway or other business; or, by reason
of some such like cause: and that a jury would not
be warranted in saying that a railroad company
should maintain those extra precautions at ordinary
crossings in the country. * * *"
In the case at bar the crossing was located in the edge
of the Town of Cokeville, a town of no more than 500 population. There were no cuts or curves in either the approaching track or the highway. There were no close buildings, no
manufacturing establishments or excess traffic that might
create noise. There was no evidence of any switching whatsoever that might cause confusing situations as far as the
passing tracks were concerned, nor even any evidence of
any unusual amount of switching on the house track, which
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was some distance to the east, and there was no evidence as
to the movement of trains over the crossing. In spite of aU
of this there was nevertheless the additional protection of
a wig,vag and bell at the crossing.
In the case of Erlvin v. Southern Pacific Co., (Ore.)
95 P. 2d 62, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated:
"There is no common law duty to provide a
greater warning to negligent or unlawful drivers
than to careful ones."
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.)
47 N. E. 2d 615, there were some obstructions to view ap- ·
proaching a crossing, and the crossing was in a residential
section of a town of about 600 people. In reversing the trial
court's judgment on the ground that P<;>well was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and with respect to the crossing, the Indiana Supreme Court said:

"* * * There was no evidence of unusual
noises calculated to interfere with hearing signals
and warnings. There was the usual cross-arm railroad warning, which was visible for a reasonable
distance to one approaching the railroad, and the
railroad company had provided, in addition to the
signals required by statute, an automatic electric
bell to warn travelers of the approach of trains.
* * * We are constrained to hold that, under
such circumstances, due care did not require the
railroad company to provide warning or signaling
devices in addition to the statutory sigrials and the
crossing bell referred to. * * *"
In Bledsoe v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., (Kan.) 90 P.
2d 9, it was argued that the crossing involved was an
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unusually dangerous one. It was on a federal and state
highway carrying especially heavy traffic. Large oil storage tanks near the track obstructed the view.
The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff. The Kansas Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and directed a judgment for defendant, and on the question of a dangerous crossing the court
said:
"Plaintiffs further contend that whether a railroad crossing is unusually dangerous is a question of
fact for the jury, * * * This is true only when
there is substantial competent evidence that the
crossing is unusually dangerous. Unless such evidence is produced the question is one of law for the
court. The authorities on this point do not go so far
as to authorize allegations to be made respecting any
railroad crossing to the effect that it is unusually
dangerous, and because of such allegations to say
that the question is one for the jury. Examining the
evidence in this case we are unable to find anything
that would justify a classification of the crossing in
question as being unusually dangerous. The fact that
it is on a paved federal and state highway and bears
the principal vehicular traffic from one direction
to or from a city is common, to a greater or less de-gree, with respect to all such highways near all the
- ·cities of the state, and as previously noted, the
amount of traffic on the highway had nothing to
do with the casualty since there was no other traffic
nearby on the highway at the time. The fact that
there were lights near by does not distinguish it
from other highways leading into and near cities.
The fact that the roadbed was two or three feet
above the level of the valley does not render it un·
usually dangerous. * * *"

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

87
See also Johnson v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Kan.) 143 P.
2d 630.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS AS REQUESTED
BY DEFENDANT WHICH WERE APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT BAR.
(Statement of Errors Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21.)
Appellant has gone to some length in arguing concerning instructions as actually given by the court which
were not applicable to the case, and we now want to refer
the court to the fact that instructions were requested by
defendant and refused by the court which were applicable
to the facts that had been developed in the case and were
in line with the standards of care which had been set by
the courts-not only of this state-but of most of the states
throughout the country.
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 15 would have
informed the jury that it was the responsibility of the deceased Toomer to see and observe and listen to the wigwag
signal and to heed its warning and stop.
Instruction No. 21 would have told the jury that the
obstruction to view which may have been created by the
standing freight train did not lessen the caution required
of Toomer, but when considered with the mechanical wigwag, imposed a higher degree of care and caution on him.
Instruction No. 23 as requested would have told the
jury that if by paying heed to the wigwag, and at least slow-
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ing his truck down if not stopping, Toomer could have seen
the approaching train in time to save himself, then he would
have been negligent. 1
Instruction No. 25 again directed attention to the
automatic wigwag and bell and told the jury that it was
Toomer's responsibility to slow down or stop in, response
thereto.
If the court had given any of such requested instructions, the ju;ry would then have been informed more properly and appropriately than it was as to the duty and measure
of care set by all of the cases, and which Toomer as a reasonable man should have been held to comply with regardless of
what a jury may conclude otherwise.
Instruction No. 16 as requested referred to physical
facts, and by measurements on Exhibit No. 1, it can be
shown that if Toomer had paid any attention whatsoever
to the crossing signal and slowed his truck down even though
he did not stop it, and if he had proceeded cautiously over
the tracks as he approached the main line track, with his
truck at a slow rate of speed, he would have been able to
see the approaching Streamliner train in time to have stopped the truck and would have avoided a collision on the
main line therewith. While the view afforded past the
. freight may have been short, still with the wigwag operating, a greater responsibility rested on Toomer, and while
we cannot admit that the court was justified in submitting
the matter to a jury at all, in submitting it to the jury as
he did, he submitted improper standards of care with which
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to let the jury speculate and did not submit instructions
requested which were proper under the circumstances.

CONCLUSION
POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL. (Statement of Error No. 22.)
In connection with safety devices or mechanical signals
which have been installed at crossings and which at a
particular time fail to work, it has been held by numerous
courts that a railroad company will not be permitted to encourage persons to relax their vigil concerning the dangers
that lurk at railroad crossings by assuring them through
the erection of such safety devices that the danger has been
removed or minimized and at the same time hold them to
the same degree of care as would be required if those devices had not been provided. See Toschi v. Christian, (Cal.)
149 P. 2d 848; Will v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal.) 116 P. 2d
44. Thus it has been held that a person may rely not wholly
but to some extent on the silent bell or wigwag at a crossing.
Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 111 Utah 289,
177 P. 2d 903. If this be true and if this be considered a
proper rule binding a railroad company to greater responsibility merely because the signal or safety device has been
installed but fails to work at a particular time, then the
opposite should also be true and travelers should be held
bound to obey a properly operating signal, and if a traveler
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attempts to pass over a crossing in the face of a swinging
wigwag, light and bell he should be held to do so at his peril
and should be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law
under such circumstances, regardless of whether there is
any statute on the subject or not. Then when there is a
statute providing a criminal penalty, as is true in the case
at bar, the matter should not even be open to argument.
We are having all too many cas.es over the country in
general and he·re in Utah in particular where people are
being killed or seriously injured because they attempt to
pass over crossings in spite of warnings of crossing signals
actually in operation at the time. The most tragic occurrence recently in the State of Utah was the one wherein six
children were killed at a crossing in Kaysville, Utah, where
an adult driving the car in which they were riding drove in
front of a fast passenger train in the face of flasher lights
then in operation.
According to the 63rd Annual Report of the Interstate
Commerce Commission (1949) p. 115, we are told that during the calendar year 1948 there occurred in the United
States 3,543 accident in which automobiles collided with
trains at grade crossings. These accidents caused the death
of 1,612 persons and injuries to 4,255 others. In 50 of such
accidents trains were derailed causing the death of 21 and
injuries to 95 persons, 84 of those killed or injured in such
derailments were rail passengers, or employes, or persons
carried on trains under contract. Because of this alarming
experience, which has not improved from year to year, the
prevention of grade crossing accidents has become a major
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problem not only for the railroads, but also for those in
charge of traffic on the highways, and should also be of
major concern to the courts-particularly the courts of
last resort in any State.
According to the 1948 statistical report of the Oregon
Public Utilities Commission, during the 10-year period
ended December 31, 1948 nearly one-third (30.87o) of the
grade crossing accidents in the State of Oregon occurred
at crossings protected by train actuated signals, wigwags
or flashing lights, or by crossing watchmen. With respect
to accidents at such signalized crossings during the 10-year
period the Oregon Public Utilities Commission found that
"Disregard of the signal, attempting to beat the train
across, and inability to stop because of excess speed, are the
causes given for most of the accidents at these locations."
An experience similar to that of the State of Oregon could
no doubt be shown for many other States and we doubt that
Utah would show a better record. Even the job of crossing
watchman has become a hazardous occupation. Many have
been struck down by motorists whose lives they were trying to save. Such a watchman, if employed by an interstate railroad, is subject to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act and railroads have been required to pay damages resulting from accidents in which such watchmen have been
killed or injured by motorists whom they were trying to
protect. See Eubanks v. Thompson, Receiver, 334 U. S.
854, 68 S. Ct. 1497, 92 L. Ed. 1776, reversing Missouri Pac.
R. Co. v. Eubanks, 207 S. W. 2d 610, 208 S. W. 2d 161.
These considerations make it increasingly important
that the degree of care required of motorists in approaching
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grade crossings shall be defined as definitely as possible,
publicized sufficiently so that it may be understood by all,
and then enforced so far as practicable.
Every experienced lawyer when he moves for a nonsuit or directed verdict senses the instinctive resistance of
trial judges to take any trial case from the jury. We understand and appreciate some of their reasons. But even conscientious judges, by undue restraint lest they invade the
jury's domain, may surrender functions which belong to
the courts. The practical effect in such instances is to let
juries, to a considerable extent at least, write their own
law for the particular case.
By instructing the jury as he did in Instructions 10,
12, 13 and 23, the trial court herein very definitely let the
jury write their own law and set their own standard~ of
care for this case.
If instructions as given by the court herein were permitted to stand and to be given in other cases, then each
jury would be free to evolve its own law of negligence for
the particular case. Believing himself . to be a reasonably
prudent person the notions o{ each juror would become the
only rules of law he could be expected to apply. He could
decide that any human conduct whatsoever, though entirely
lawful otherwise, constituted negligence for the purposes of
the particular case. Conversely, he could decide that most
any sort of conduct, though dangerous to others, violated
no legal duty to them. He could by being thus unlimited in
his decisions as to what a reasonable man might in his
.opinion do, overrule de·cisions of this court with respect to
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standards required of all men as have been set and reaffirmed in cases like Wilkinson v. Oregon Short LineR. Co.,
35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466; Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203
P. 869: Sho'rtino v. Salt Lake & Utah R. R., 52 Utah 476,
174 P. 860; Nuttall v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 383, 99
P. 2d 15; Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 103 Utah
274, 135 P. 2d 115; and Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903.
With reference to railroad cases particularly, exact
standards of care considered to be a minimum, regardless
of what a jury might decide, have been set by this and other
courts, and with the horrible experience of increasing aGcidents these standards should not be relaxed; particularly
where a standard is set by legislative mandate it should be
strictly adhered to. Any other policy would do nothing but .
encourage travelers on a highway to relax their care and
caution and accidents would increase still more.
One of our Third District Court judges who IS now
aspiring to become a member of this court was recently
quoted ip an editorial in the Salt Lake Telegram (March
31, 1950) as saying there was too much "hocus-pocus" and
"voodooism" in the law and. that many a layman has become confused and bewildered because of "legalistic profundities." Be this criticism right or wrong, the courts ·
should adhere to and make more pronounced, if possible,
the standards to which a highway traveler should be bound
so that a layman would know what his responsibility is.
If a court could submit questions to a jury to let the
jury speculate on the question as to whether a reasonable
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man driving a vehicle would enter on a crossing in face of
a lighted, moving and sounding signal, with nothing more
than that being shown, and in face of a statute prohibiting
it and in spite of the uncontradicted evidence, as shown in
the instant case, that the driver of the vehicle did not even
slow down, and if such should be adopted as a proper rule,
WHAT THEN COULD LAYMEN EXPECT? What could
attorneys advise as to any standard of care required of all
men, upon which standard reasonable minds should not
differ? Under such circumstances we would have to advise
laymen, officials, railroad employes and operatives, and
all alike, and we would have to say to them : "Just what
you are really expected to do we cannot say, but that will
be determined by some future jury after you have had an
accident, which jury will then be allowed to decide on their
own as to whether or not they think you acted as a reasonable man."
As early as the Wilkinson case, supra, if not earlier,
this court stated that certain standards must be met regardless of what a jury might find and without passing the
rnatter to a jury where the facts are admitted, or not in
dispute. In that case this court said that the law as generally adopted and applied by courts in this country was:
"When one approaches a point upon a highway
where a railroad track is crossed upon the same
level it is his plain duty to proceed with caution, and
if he attempts to cross the track, either on foot or in
vehicle of /any description, he must exercise in so
doing what the law regards as ordinary care under
the circumstances. He must assume that there· is
danger, and act with ordinary prudence and circum·
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spection on that assumption. The requirements of
the law, moreover, proceed beyond the featureless
generality that one must do his duty in this respect,
or must exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. The la~v defines precisely ~vkat the term
'ordina.ry ca-re under the circumstances' shall mean
in these cases. In the progress of the law in this
behalf the question of care at railw'ay crossings, as
affecting the tra.veler, is no longer, as a rule, a question fo1· the jury. The quantum of care is exactly
prescribed as a matter of law. In attempting to cross
the tra,veler must listen for signals, notice signs put
u,p as ~varnings, and look attentively up and down
the track." (Italics ours.)
These standards have long been adhered to but litigants
and zealous attorneys have tried to force their relaxation
to enable them to play upon the minds of sympathetic jurors, and protections afforded by the railroad companies
have many times been stated to be only a minimum and
courts have let the jury decide if more were needed. It
has not been difficult to figure out some new and extraordinary obligation which, if performed by the railroad,
might have insured a particular driver against his own
carelessness. And experience reminds us that the maximum
precaution which an ingenious litigant can suggest today
may eventually become the minimum which some future
jury may impose.
We ask the court to look at this case from the standpoint of its ultimate effect upon the railroads and the public
generally so that by the pronouncement of this court the
public may know whether or not they must pay any attention to warning signal devices erected at crossings, and so

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

96

that railroads may likewise know whether it is worthwhile
in any event to erect such signalling devices in an effort
to give further protection to the public.
The question as to whether or not adequate warning of
the approach of, the train herein had been given under the
facts in this case should have been determined as a matter
of law by the court and not submitted to the jury. The
question of ·whether it was negligence for the engineer to
enter the crossing at thirty miles per hour with all the
warnings given, as shown by the record, on the basis. of
whether such warnings were adequate, should have been
decided as a rna tter of law by the court and not submitted
to the jury. With the evidence uncontradicted that the wigwag, light and bell were all in operation at the time and
that T'oomer without exercising any caution at all and in
violation of statutory law applicable thereto approached
and ·passed over the crossing at 25 to 30 miles per hour,
without having at any time stopped or slowed down, the
court should have determined that he was guilty of negligence as a rna tter of law and should have directed a verdict
for the defendant. Having failed to do so, this court should
reverse the trial court and direct such verdict for the defendant.
By holding T'oomer guilty of negligence as a matter
of law and reversing the trial court on the basis. that such
tnal court should have granted the directed verdict, this
court will not be creating new law (in spite of the fact
that the majority of law concerning negligence in tort cases
was originally court-made law rather than law established
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by any legislature). By so reversing the trial court and

directing a verdict in favor of the defendant this court
will only be affirming a standard heretofore set by the
courts in the first instance and finally adopted as an absolute standard by legislative fiat.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
judgment should be entered for the defendant.

Respectfully submitted,

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
_HOWARD F. CORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,

Counsel for Defendant
and AppeUant.

10 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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